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ANTITRUST LAW 
PHONETELE V. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH: 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEREGULATES MA BELL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In Phonetele u. American Telephone & Telegraph, l the 
Ninth Circuit held that telephone companies have no implied 
antitrust immunity under the Communications Act of 1934.1 
The court held that a telephone company may, however, defend 
antitrust violations by showing that it had a reasonable basis to 
conclude its actions were necessitated by explicit regulatory 
mandates. This note will examine federal and state regulation of 
telecommunications and how the court reconciled the conflict . 
between such regulations and the antitrust laws. 
B. FACTS 
Plaintiffs Phonetele and DASA manufacture and market 
telephone call monitoring and diverting devices for consumer 
1. 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981), consolidated appeal with DASA Corporation v. Gen-
eral Telephone & Telegraph; (per Kennedy, J.; the other panel members were Fletcher, 
J., and Claiborne, D.J., sitting by designation, diBSenting), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 785 
(1983). 
2. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 151, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47 
U.S.C. § 151 (1976». Section 151 states: 
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce 
in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, 
so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a 
rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable 
charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the pur-
pose of promoting safety of life and property through the use 
of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of se-
curing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing 
authority heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by 
granting additional authority with respect to interstate and 
foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is 
created a commiBBion to be known as the "Federal Communi-
cations CommiBBion", which shall be constituted as hereinafter 
provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions 
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and business use. 8 The devices must be electrically connected to 
the national telephone network to operate. 
Defendant American Telephone and Telegraph (AT & T) 
had prohibited, pursuant to a regulatory tariff filed with the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC),· the direct electri-
cal connection of customer-provided equipment to the telephone 
network without the use of a telephone company supplied device 
known as a "protective connecting arrangement," or PCA. De-
fendant General Telephone and Telegraph (General) had also 
filed a similar tariff with the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion (CPUC).II 
DASA's 1973 complaint alleged that General and Ford In-
dustries, manufacturer of another automatic call diverter, had 
combined since the filing of the subject tariff to unreasonably 
restrain trade in the call diverter market with a concerted goal 
of suppressing competition in violation of section one of the 
Sherman Act.8 DASA further alleged that General and its co-
conspirators had controlled at least 90 % of the call diverter 
market in particular parts of California, monopolizing that mar-
ket and undertaking to destroy actual and potential competitors 
in violation of section two of the Sherman Act.' 
3. Phonetele manufactures and markets a device called a "Phonemaster," which, 
when electrically connected to the telephone network, prevents outgoing calls to tele-
phones that are not in preselected area codes. The result to its users is a cost savings 
through prevention of misdialed or unauthorized calls. 
DASA manufactures and markets the "Divert-A-Call" which is also electrically at-
tached to the telephone system. It screens incoming calls and automatically transfers 
them to other numbers or extensions. 664 F.2d at 720. 
4. Revised Tariff F.C.C. No. 263, filed October 22, 1968, permitting interconnection, 
provided that AT & T hardware was used to form the linkage between the customer-
supplied device and the telephone line. The tariff also required the customer to pay AT 
& T an installation charge and a monthly service fee for the interconnecting equipment. 
664 F.2d at 724. 
5. C.P.U.C. Interim Decision No. 80972, April 22, 1975, finalized in May 1976, mod-
ifying General's tariff, provided for a system of registration of customer-provided equip-
ment based on their varying technical specifications. 664 F.2d at 726. 
6. Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1982) 
states in part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal." 
7. Section two of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973 & Supp. 1982) 
states in part "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine 
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
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Phonetele's 1974 complaint alleged that AT & T, the 23 
companies in which it has major interests, and its subsidiaries 
Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories combined 
and agreed to restrain trade in the marketing, sales and distribu-
tion of Phonetele's "Phonemaster", It also alleged that these de-
fendants conspired to monopolize the telephone terminal equip-
ment market, and conducted tying8 arrangements, all in 
violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Act9 and sec-
tion three of the Clayton Act,lO 
The district courts dismissed both actions on the ground 
that the FCC had exclusive jurisdiction concerning the intercon-
felony .... " 
8. To establish a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act, it must be 
demonstrated that a scheme involves two distinct items and provides that one, the tying 
product, may not be obtained unless the other, the tied product, is also purchased; that 
the tying product possesses sufficient economic power to appreciably restrain competi-
tion in the tied product's market; and that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is 
affected by the arrangement. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 47 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). 
9. See notes 6 and 7, supra. 
10. Section three of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in 
the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, 
for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or 
any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insu-
lar possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the 
United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount 
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, 
or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not 
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, sup-
plies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of 
the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or con-
tract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding 
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly in any line of commerce. 
Phonetele further claimed that AT & T and its operating subsidiaries control ap-
proximately 80% of the telephone lines and that this effectively gave AT & T complete 
power over all 1,700 independent phone companies (such as defendant General), which 
must use these interstate lines. Phoneteie also alleged AT & T's misconduct in the im-
plementation of the relevant tariff and that AT & T was wrongfully responsible for the 
conforming state tariffs and enforcement efforts. 664 F.2d at 721. 
Phonetele specifically charged that the interconnection of the Phonemaster required 
only a simple terminal block. It complained of the poor quality of the PCA available and 
that it was only available for a time in limited parts of the country. When finally availa-
ble to states outside California, Phonetele alleged that it was three-and-one-half times as 
expensive as the already too expensive coupler in California. 664 F.2d at 721. 
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nection of equipment with the telephone network. Those courts 
found the defendants were therefore impliedly immune from an-
titrust suits pursuant to the FCC's authority under the Commu-
nications Act. 11 
C. BACKGROUND 
The Communications Act of 1934 (the Act) provides the 
FCC with regulatory powers over common carriers engaged in 
telecommunications.18 The Act's primary purpose is to further 
the public interest by making available rapid and efficient tele-
phone service.13 The Act gives the FCC jurisdiction over inter-
state and foreign telephone communications, but expressly ex-
cludes FCC jurisdiction over intrastate communications. 1. 
11. See Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 435 F. Supp. 207 (C.D. Cal. 
1977). 
The district court decision discussed the statutory and regulatory foundations of 
telecommunications, concluding that the FCC's authority and the pervasive regulatory 
scheme of the Act impliedly immunized AT & T from antitrust suit. See also DASA 
Corp. v. General Tel. & Tel. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,610 (C.D. Cal. 1977). The 
DASA district court decision rested on the conclusion that the FCC has exclusive juris-
diction over interconnection and therefore did not reach the implied immunity issue 
with respect to General's conduct. 
12. The Act specifically granted the FCC jurisdiction over "all instrumentalities, fa-
cilities, apparatus and services ... incidental to [wire communications) transmission." 
47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976). 
13. See note 2, supra. In addition, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976) states: "The Commis-
sion may prescribe such rules and regulations 811 may be necessary in the public interest 
to carry out the [Act)." 
As a further part of its public interest function, the FCC has an express duty to 
"keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which [the business of all carriers) 
is conducted and as to technical developments and improvements in wire and radio com-
munication ... to the end that the benefits of new inventions and developments may be 
made available to [consumers)." 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1976). 
14. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976) states in part that nothing in the chapter on common 
carriers "shall be construed to apply or to give the [FCC) jurisdiction with respect to (1) 
charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection 
with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier. . .. " It is further 
provided that the FCC shall not have jurisdiction over any "connecting carrier," i.e., a 
carrier which provides interstate communication only through physical connection with 
another carrier not controlling it or controlled by it. 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1976). , 
Even though General is an intrastate carrier regulated by the CPUC, it is subject to 
AT & T's tariffs regarding interconnection because of the potential use of terminal 
equipment in interstate connections. Thus, the FCC's assertion of primary authority is 
controlling over both AT & T's and General's interconnection-related conduct. This ex-
ercise of jurisdiction has been upheld. See Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 
(1974), aff'd sub nom., North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). 
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To carry out its policies, the Act requires that carriers file 
tariffs with the FCC, outlining the carriers' plans for operation. III 
No carrier may engage in business unless, upon proper notice, 
tariffs have been filed, nor may a carrier change any of its prac-
tices before amending a previous tariff or by filing a new tariff. 18 
A tariff must be "just and reasonable"17 and "any change, 
practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasona-
ble is declared to be unlawful."18 The FCC may, either at its 
discretion or upon the filing of a complaint by a third party, 
hold hearings regarding the legality of a carrier's practices, and 
may suspend a tariff pending completion of its hearings.19 Upon 
a finding that a tariff violates or may violate the Act, the FCC 
may grant injunctive relief and other sanctions.20 
AT & T and Interconnection Tariffs 
Until 1956, AT & T's tariffs generally prohibited intercon-
nection of all non-telephone company supplied equipment. In 
Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States,21 blanket prohibitions 
15. Section 203(a) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1976), requires such carriers to file 
tariffs with the FCC "showing all charges ... and showing the classifications, practices, 
and regulations affecting such charges." 
16. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. 1982). 
17. 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976). 
18. Id. Also, 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any un-
just or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, clas-
sifications, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connec-
tion with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by 
any means or device, or to make or give any undue or unrea-
sonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class 
of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, 
class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable 
prejudice or disadvantage. 
19. 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1976 & Supp. 1982) allows the FCC to suspend use of a new 
tariff for 5 months. If the hearings have not been completed within that time, the tariff 
becomes effective, although it may later be invalidated by the FCC. 
20. Failure to obey an FCC order will result in a $1,000 fine for each violation, to be 
levied each day in the case of continuing offenses. 47 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1976). A carrier 
found to have violated the Act is liable to any person injured for the "full amount of 
damages sustained," plus attorney's fees. 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1976). There are two avenues 
of recovery: a party may sue in any United States district court, 47 U.S.C. § 207 (1976), 
or a party may file a complaint with the FCC, 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1976). The FCC may 
conduct an investigation and, if it concludes there are reasonable grounds to support the 
complaint and the complaining party is entitled to damages, it may order the carrier to 
pay. 47 U.S.C. § 209 (1976). See 664 F.2d 716, 722 n.12. 
21. 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956), after remand, 22 F.C.C. 112 (1957). 
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against interconnection of all such equipment were struck down. 
AT & T thereafter filed a tariff prohibiting all "direct electrical 
connection" and interconnection by any means of customer-pro-
vided equipment.22 In 1965, this tariff was the subject of an anti-
trust suit brought against AT & T which was stayed pending 
FCC review of its validity under the Act's standards.23 That re-
view culminated in the Carterphone decision,24 wherein the FCC 
held that the subject tariff's overbreadth violated the Act's just 
and reasonable standard.211 The FCC thereafter permitted carri-
ers to submit new tariffs allowing interconnection that would not 
"adversely affect the [carrier's] operations or the telephone sys-
tem's utility for others."28 
AT & T responded to the new FCC mandate with a tariff 
prohibiting direct electrical connection of certain devices with-
out PCAs provided and installed by the carrier.1? Without either 
affirming or rejecting the tariff, the FCC left it operational pend-
ing consideration of the effect the tariff might have on the tele-
phone network.28 The FCC commenced investigations and, in 
1975, concluded that the latest tariff also violated the Communi-
cations Act.29 As part of that decision, the FCC proposed a regis-
tration program which in part permitted carriers to require the 
use of PCAs for certain customer-supplied terminal equipment30 
The Hush-A-Phone was a cup-shaped listening device physically connected to the 
telephone receiver. Requiring no electrical connection to the telephone network, it pro-
vided privacy to the user and quiet for persons around the phone. Id. at 267. 
22. Tariff F.C.C. No. 132 (filed April 16, 1957), superseded by tariff F.C.C. No. 263 
(filed January 2, 1968). 
23. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), alf'd, 365 F.2d 486 
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967). The plaintiff manufactured the 
Carterphone, which was inductively connected to the telephone, thereby permitting the 
caller to connect his telephone to a two-way radio. 365 F.2d at 490. 
24. Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 
420, reconsideration denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). 
25. The tariff was found unreasonable because it "prohibit[ed) the use of harmless 
as well as harmful devices." Carterphone, 13 F.C.C.2d at 424, quoted in Phonetele, 664 
F.2d at 724. 
26. 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424. 
27. Revised Tariff F.C.C. No. 263 (filed November, 1968). 
28. The FCC stated: "[W)e will permit the tariff revisions to become effective as 
scheduled with the understanding that in doing so we are not giving any specific ap-
proval to the revised tariffs." See Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 723-24 n.21. 
29. 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), modified in part, 57 F.C.C.2d 1216 (1976), alf'd sub. 
nom. North Carolina Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 874 (1977). 
30. The program basically allows interconnection if equipment is attached with FCC 
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including Phonetele's "Phonemaster" and DASA's "Divert-A-
Call."31 
Implied Antitrust Immunity 
Where Congress has failed to explicitly address the issue of 
the antitrust liability of a regulated entity, courts have generally 
implied such immunity to preserve the integrity of the regula-
tory scheme.3s However, despite this apparent preference for 
regulatory statutes, the Supreme Court has stressed that implied 
antitrust immunity is strongly disfavored,33 that it should be 
found only where a "clear repugnancy" between the antitrust 
and regulatory laws exist,3. and only where conferring an im-
plied antitrust immunity is necessary to make the regulatory 
program work.311 
In Pan American World Airways v. United States,3e the 
Court set forth a standard whereby antitrust immunity will not 
be implied where the alleged antitrust violations comprise the 
"precise ingredients" of the regulatory agency's authority.37 
Other factors have been considered such as whether the agency 
may grant adequate relief,88 whether competition is part of the 
registered protective connectors or if the customer-supplied equipment is itself regis-
tered. See generally 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.100-.110 (1981). The validity of this program has 
been upheld. See North Carolina Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, supra note 29. 
31. CPUC's consideration and investigations of the tariffs filed by General which 
paralleled AT & T's are discussed at 664 F.2d at 725-26. The "primary jurisdiction" 
holding of North Carolina Util. Comm'n., supra note 29, appears to resolve any conflict 
between state and federal interpretation of the similar tariffs. 
32. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n. of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 
(1975) (securities dealers); Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 
(1975) (stock exchanges); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) 
(generation and transmission of electrical power); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc.; 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (airline parts supply); Pan American World Airways, Inc. 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (airlines); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l 
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (national banking); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 
439 (1945) (railroads); National Gerimedical H08p. & Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross 
of Kansas City, 628 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir. 1980) (group medical insurance plana). 
33. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 351. 
34. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra note 32, at 456. 
35. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
36. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). 
37. [d. at 307-08. 
38. The Pan Am case concerned unfair practices in air carrier route8. The action, for 
trade restraint in violation of the Sherman Act, was brought by the Government and 
dismissed by the Supreme Court which held that the Civil Aeronautics Board was statu-
torily granted the authority under the Civil Aeronautics Act to regulate the division of 
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agency's guiding standards,39 whether the agency has sufficient 
expertise in a particular area,40 and whether the antitrust case 
involves important questions of regulatory policy.u The Court 
has cautioned that where "relationships [with competitors] are 
governed in the first instance by business judgment and not reg-
ulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to conclude that Con-
gress intended to override the fundamental national policies em-
bodied in the antitrust laws. "42 
Regarding telecommunications, most courts have found no 
such immunity exists.43 Those courts have noted the Act's si-
lence on the subject as well as the lack of any clear indication 
concerning immunity from its legislative history.44 Courts con-
sidering interconnection-related activities have held, as the 
Phonetele court did, that no implied antitrust immunity exists 
territories and allocation of routes between carriers. The Court stated: "Limitation of 
routes and divisions of territories and the relation of common carriers to air carriers are 
basic in [the Civil Aeronautics Act) regulatory scheme. The acts charged in this civil suit 
as antitrust violations are precise ingredients of the Board's authority in granting, quali-
.eying, or denying certificates to air carriers,. . . and in allowing or disallowing affiliations 
between common carriers and air carriers." 371 U.S. at 305. 
39. FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953). 
40. Carter, supra note 23, at 492. 
41. Pan American World Airways, supra note 32, at 310. 
42. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, supra note 32, at 374. 
43. See, e.g., Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 
F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Sup'p. 1314 
(D.D.C. 1978); M.C'!. Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 
1072 (N.D. Ill.), mandamus denied, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
971 (1979). For a detailed discussion of antitrust laws in the telecommunications indus-
try, see Note, The Application of Antitrust Law to Telecommunications, 69 CALIF. L. 
REv. 497 (1981); Note, AT & T and the Antitrust Laws, 85 YALE L.J. 254 (1975). 
44. Federal regulation of the telecommunications industry begins with the Mann-
Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ I, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15, 
16, 20 (1976», and the Willis-Graham Act, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921). The Senate discus-
sions during the drafting of the Communications Act indicate that the FCC is to have 
"comprehensive jurisdiction over the [telecommunications) industry." S. REP. No. 781, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). 
Explicit immunity from antitrust violations is found regarding certain FCC-ap-
proved consolidations and mergers of telephone companies. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a), 222(c)(1) 
(1976). One court opined that the "explicit immunization of certain FCC-approved con-
solidations and mergers [under these sections of the Act) ... indicates that Congress 
did not contemplate blanket [antitrust) immunity." Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. 
Co., 631 F.2d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1980). 
As recently as 1970, Congress has declined to extend the applicability of the anti-
trust laws to telecommunications while doing so to radio. See 47 U.S.C. § 313 (1976). The 
discrepancy in congressional intent appears to be based upon the interpretation that 
broadcasters are not common carriers. See Note, AT & T and the Antitrust Laws, supra 
note 43, at 270 n.76, citing FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 474 (1940). 
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and that liability for violations of the antitrust laws is subject to 
proof.411 
For example, in Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. CO.,48 
plaintiff alleged that defendant Bell Systems' required use of its 
own PCAs had violated the antitrust laws. Bell claimed that it 
had required the PCAs because it did not know how otherwise 
to protect the integrity of its equipment. The court noted that 
determining such harm was a "factual matter to be established 
at trial. The claim is relevant, if at all, only to the merits of the 
antitrust charges rather than to the claim of immunity."f7 
D. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
1. The Majority 
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant telephone com-
panies were not impliedly immune from antitrust violations, but 
that they may, upon a sufficient factual showing, defend against 
antitrust claims on the basis of necessary compliance with ex-
plicit regulatory mandates.fa The court did not hold that im-
plied antitrust immunity is never applicable. Rather, ~t noted 
the lack of a "simplistic and mechanically universal doctrine of 
implied antitrust immunity."fe A court must therefore consider 
special aspects of an industryliO as well as the existence of an 
explicit regulatory mandate sufficient to confer such an immu-
nitylll before holding that a defendant's actions shall enjoy pro-
tection from the antitrust laws. 
45. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. ~Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 
1981); Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980); Essential 
Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 487 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Jarvis, 
Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 481 F. Supp. 120 (D. D.C. 1978); Interconnect Planning 
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 465 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. N.Y. 1978); Macom Prods. Corp. v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 359 F. Supp. 973 (C.D. Cal. 1973). 
46. 631 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) (propriety of design of AT & T's PCA a jury ques-
tion); Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d 1114 
(3d Cir. 1979) (facts parallel to those of Phonetele). 
47. 631 F.2d at 1330 n.7. 
48. 664 F.2d 716, 740. 
49. Id. at 727. 
50.ld. 
5l. Id. at 73l. 
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Special Aspects of a Regulated Industry 
The court found that defendants' interpretation of the im-
plied immunity cases ignored consideration of the special as-
pects of a particular industry. Specifically, the historical con-
texts, legislative histories and express statutory authority of the 
agencies that regulate such industries differ widely.1I2 
The court paid particular attention to defendants' reliancell8 
on two Supreme Court cases granting implied antitrust immu-
nity in the securities field: Gordon v. New York Stock Ex-
change,lI. and United States v. National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers (NASD) 1111. In Gordon, a group of investors had 
challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) 
authorized fixing of stock sales commission rates as a violation 
of the antitrust laws. Rejecting the challenge, the Court held 
that, under the Securities Exchange Act,1I8 Congress had in-
tended to leave supervision of the fixing of reasonable rates of 
commission to the SEC and thus had impliedly immunized the 
practice from antitrust suit. The Court found such immunity de-
spite the fact that seven years prior to the grant of supervisory 
power to the SEC, it had held that price fixing was a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act.1I7 Further, the Court held that im-
plying immunity would impede the operation of the SEC which 
had been successfully supervising the fixing of commissions for a 
period of years. liB 
In NASD, the Court found implied immunity necessary to 
curb competition in mutual fund brokerage transactions. It held 
52. [d. at 727-30. 
53. General also relied on the so-called state action exemption of Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943). Interpreting the recent case of California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), the court stated that (1) if the 
challenged restraint is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy and 
(2) that policy is actively supervised by the state, such an exemption would protect Gen-
eral. The court did not find that the CPUC's involvement with the relevant tariff rose to 
the Parker level, since the CPUC only permitted General to file the PCA tariff. As with 
the FCC, this was not to be interpreted as the CPUC's (and therefore the state's) adop-
tion of the tariff as its policy. 664 F.2d at 736. 
54. 422 U.S. 659 (1975). 
55. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1975). 
57. 422 U.S. 659, 691. The per se rule was established in United States v. Trenton 
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
58. 422 U.S. at 687. 
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that vertical restrictions on secondary market activities created 
to limit such transactions were the exact prohibitions contem-
plated by the Investment Company Act of 1940.119 
The Phonetele court distinguished the securities cases by 
noting the Supreme Court's deference to the SEC in order to 
make the securities laws work, laws which were designed to pre-
vent harm to investors that might occur in the absence of regu-
lations.so In comparison, the court found, such harm to the pub-
lic from the lack of regulation of interconnection had not been 
shown, either through legal precedent or regulatory action.s1 
The court further noted that the authority given the FCC 
by statute was significantly different from that of the SEC as 
evidenced by an analysis of the legislative history as well as an 
examination of the language of the statutes. For example, as 
found in Gordon, under the Securities Exchange Act the SEC is 
given express authority to regulate the securities exchanges' 
fixing of reasonable rates of commission,s2 despite Congress' un-
derstanding that an antitrust violation might result.s3 In con-
trast, the FCC neither approves nor disapproves an industry-
submitted tariff, nor does it adopt such tariff as agency policy or 
have any obligation under the statute to find that the tariff nec-
essarily effectuates the purpose of the Communications Act.s• 
Antitrust Immunity Implied by Regulatory Mandate 
The Ninth Circuit held that implied antitrust immunity 
may be conferred by the presence of three elements demonstra-
ting a regulatory mandate: (1) explicit congressional approval of 
the ultimate anti competitive effect of the challenged conduct; 
(2) explicit authorization by Congress to an agency or private 
entity to order the challenged conduct; and (3) no inconsistency 
between the challenged conduct and an express policy of the 
governing agency.SII The Phonetele court found none of these el-
59. 422 U.S. 694, 721-22 (1975). 
60. 664 F.2d at 727 n.31. 
61. [d. 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(I), (e)(I)(B) (1981). 
63. Gordon, supra note 54, at 664-68. 
64. 664 F.2d at 733. 
65. This standard appears to have been culled from Gordon and NASD, i.e., that 
"the agency must have sufficient freedom of action to carry out its regulatory mission, 
11
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ements present. With respect to the third element, the court 
particularly noted that, to the contrary, the FCC had clearly ex-
pressed a preference for competition unless a lack of restrictions 
necessary to preventing damage to the phone system was 
evident.88 
The court recognized some merit to defendants' primary ar-
gument.87 Defendants had asserted that, after Carterphone, they 
were faced with the conflicting duties of ensuring the expansion 
of the use of non-telephone company supplied interconnection 
devices while at the same time ensuring the safety and efficiency 
of the phone network against harm from such devices. They ar-
gued that the pro-competitive purpose of the antitrust laws con-
flicted with the public interest purpose of the Communications 
Act, therefore requiring immunity.IIS However, the court found 
that no actual repugnancy existed.lIe For example, it found that 
the remedies available under the Act and the antitrust laws were 
complimentary,70 and that the Carterphone mandate, upon 
which defendants had based their argument, was inapposite. 
Carterphone, the court noted, was "itself responsive to a stay in 
an antitrust case pending in the federal courts, and the FCC's 
decision contemplated that the federal court would 'pass ulti-
and the regulated entity should not be required to act with reference to inconsistent 
standards of conduct." 664 F.2d 716, 731-32. 
66. Carterphone mandated that an interconnection-restricting tariff was unreason-
able under the Act unless its intent was to prevent actual harm to the telephone net-
work. Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 731 n.3S. 
67. 664 F.2d at 732. 
6S. The Eighth Circuit was much tougher on the telephone companies in this re-
gard. In Sound, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 631 F.2d 1324 (Sth Cir. 1980), the court 
found the "inconsistency" that AT & T had based its argument for immunity on was 
self-imposed, rather than the result of any regulatory mandate. It noted that in the filing 
of its prohibitory tariffs, defendant "implements its own business judgment in regard to 
its relationship with competitors." ld. at 1331. 
69. 664 F.2d at 732. 
70. Carterphone, supra note 24, at 421 (quoted in Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 730-31). 
The court also noted that the "absence of a damages remedy under the [Act] weighs 
against finding an implied antitrust immunity and gives the antitrust court a role in 
enforcing the public interest standards of the [Communications Act]." ld. at 735 n.47. 
Consistency could further be inferred in that it is doubtful plaintiff could recover under 
both statutes. ld. at 735 n.4S. But see Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 409 F. 
Supp. SOO (D.C. Puerto Rico 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1979) for the proposition 
that the Communications Act does not grant a private right of action for a telephone 
company's refusal to interconnect plaintiff's own phone system with the telephone net-
work. See also Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 734 n.46 and cases cited therein. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6
1983] ANTITRUST LAW 59 
mately upon the antitrust issues . . '''71 
Regulatory Necessity as a Defense 
The court concluded its decision by recognizing that, where 
no implied immunity exist~, "[ilf a defendant can establish that, 
at the time the various anticompetitive acts alleged . . . were 
taken, it had a reasonable basis to conclude that its actions were 
necessitated by concrete factual imperatives recognized as legiti-
mate by the regulatory authority, then its actions did not violate 
the antitrust laws:"72 The defense may only be established 
through a factual inquiry, focusing on whether the interconnec-
tion equipment could damage defendants' equipment or disrupt 
the telephone system in identifiable ways, and whether the tariff 
as filed was the most reasonable, narrowly tailored method then 
available to guard against harm.73 
The court made it clear that these issues were factual and 
that it would not undertake an exploration of the merits of 
plaintiff's claims.74 Further, it admonished defendants that the 
justification of regulatory necessity could not be based on mis-
71. Id. at 730-31. 
72. Id. at 737-38. The court noted that General may be entitled to antitrust immu-
nity on another ground. Its facilities were used for interstate communications and, under 
Telerent, supra note 15, federal law controlled their tariffs. Therefore, "[t)o the extent 
General's decision to require [PCAs) was dictated by AT & T's tariff revisions filed with 
the FCC, its own PCA tariff may have been a justified, if not a coerced, compliance with 
the requirements of the federal and state regulatory schemes." 664 F.2d at 737 n.56. 
73. 664 F.2d at 738. The court also suggested how defendants might sustain their 
burden of proof: 
The defendants might, for example, attempt to demonstrate 
why methods of protecting the system which did not depend 
on particularized knowledge about the technical specifications 
of all types of equipment that might be interconnected, would 
have been either inadequate or not reasonably foreseeable. 
One such method is suggested by the FCC-proposed tariff in 
1975, namely the requirement that those desiring to connect 
foreign equipment first notify the telephone company with the 
provision that the telephone company could temporarily dis-
continue service to any customer whose equipment was caus-
ing actual harm to the telephone network. 
Id. at 738 n.58. 
74. The court stated: "These factual justifications, the resolution of which is neces-
sarily open at this point, are to be distinguished from the various legal issues in the case 
which we now foreclose." 664 F.2d at 738. 
Nevertheless, in what appears to be dicta, the court surveyed Ninth Circuit law with 
respect to plaintiffs' claims for antitrust violations, particularly with a view toward how 
defendants might defend against them. See 664 F.2d at 738-40. 
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takes of law or interpretation of the Act, judicial or FCC opin~ 
ions.711 Defendants would also be precluded from filing any tar~ 
iffs they chose or arguing they had to file tariffs absent a 
demonstration of the factors required to satisfy the defense.76 
2. The Dissent 
Judge Claiborne, dissenting, surveyed the four most recent 
Supreme Court opinions on implied antitrust immunity.77 He ar~ 
gued that, under those cases, immunity must be found if three 
questions are affirmatively answered: 
1) Has Congress conferred upon the regulatory 
agency sufficient authority to regulate the con-
duct which is alleged to be anticompetitive? 2) 
Does the history of the regulatory agency's activi-
ties with respect to the regulation of this conduct 
suggest no laxity in the exercise of this authority? 
3) If the federal antitrust laws were to be con-
strued by a federal court as outlawing the regu-
lated activity, is there reason to believe that the 
agency's regulation of the industry in question 
will no longer be able to function efi'ectively?78 
As to the first question, the dissent argued that Congress 
had granted individuals a right of action against AT & T for 
damages resulting from unjust and unreasonable practices set 
forth by tariffs.78 He added that AT & T's liability is not neces~ 
sarily limited to anticompetitive practices.80 
As to the second question, Judge Claiborne traced the his-
tory of FCC involvement in interconnection tariffs. He noted the 
studies that had been commissioned by the FCC and at least 17 
states, including California, concerning the "whole matter" of in-
terconnection.81 Those studies had culminated in the FCC's 
adoption of a federal registration program for the regulation of 
75. ld. at 738. 
76. The court was apparently foreclosing the argument that an antitrust-violative 
tariff is reasonable or necessary until the FCC disapproves of it. 
77. 664 F.2d at 747. The cases examined by the dissent were Gordon, supra note 32, 
NASD, supra note 32, Hughes Tool Co., supra note 32, and Cantor v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). 
78. 664 F.2d at 747. 




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6
1983] ANTITRUST LAW 61 
interconnection of customer-provided equipment.82 He argued 
that the FCC's regulation of interconnection clearly showed no 
laxity in the exercise of its authority, in one case to the point of 
preempting the state public utility/service commissions.83 
As to the third question, the dissent reasoned that the FCC 
should have the power to regulate interconnection. Conceding 
speculation, he suggested that allowing private interconnection 
in order to avoid defendants' antitrust liability might simultane-
ously result in harm to the telephone network. The FCC's au-
thority to regulate would thus be impaired by what obviously 
appears to be the courts' partiality to unfettered competition, 
rather than deference to the FCC's role and the purpose of the 
Communications Act.8• 
The dissent acknowledged that his view would create a con-
flict with the Third Circuit's holding in Essential Communica-
tions Systems, Inc. v. AT & T,86 which dealt with the same is-
sues and facts as Phonetele. Nevertheless, he found that the 
Essential Communications court had failed to attend to the 
holdings of Gordon86 and N ASD. 87 He found that the Essential 
Communications court had especially ignored the parallels be-
tween the SEC's involvement with the regulated broker-dealers 
and the FCC's involvement with the telephone companies. That 
similarity, as well as the lack of specific anticompetitive lan-
guage in either the relevant securities laws or the Act also re-
quired a finding of implied immunity here.88 
The dissent further noted that the existence of a "savings 
clause" in the Act did not alter the general rule requiring that 
plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies under the Act 
prior to initiating suit.8e The Ninth Circuit, he argued, had pre-
viously addressed that same issue and had deferred to the 
82. 47 C.F.R. §§ 68.100-.506 (1981); 664 F.2d at 750. 
83. 664 F.2d at 744, 750. See Telerent, supra note 14. 
84. 664 F.2d at 750-51. 
85. 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979). 
86. Supra note 32. 
87. Supra note 32. 
88. 664 F.2d at 752. 
89. 47 U.S.C. § 414 (1981) reads: "Nothing in this chapter contained shall in any 
way abridge or alter the remedies now exi8ting at common law or by statute, but the 
provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.~' See also 664 F.2d at 751-52. 
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FCC.90 
E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Communications Act was enacted for the purpose of 
regulating wire communication and making available a "rapid 
and efficient ... wire communication service ... with adequate 
facilities at reasonable charges."91 When enacted, telecommuni-
cations technology was primitive compared with the complex 
systems currently in use. Even as late as the 1950's, there were 
few private companies engaged in the field and the prevailing 
concern with maintaining an efficient telephone network was 
with avoiding duplicative facilities, not with the possibility of 
improving the phone system through the efforts of private 
enterprise.92 
In this regard the Phonetele decision, at least in result, ap-
pears to embrace the spirit of the Act. There is little doubt that 
plaintiffs' devices will make more rapid and efficient their con-
sumers' use of the telephone system. All cases considered by the 
courts and the FCC concerning private entries into the telecom-
munications marketplace have recognized such a benefit.93 The 
Phonetele decision comports with this limited precedent. 
More broadly, the court commendably addressed the prob-
lem of the lack of a rational standard for implying antitrust im-
munity. Other courts have adopted such watchwords as "exclu- . 
sive jurisdiction," "pervasive regulatory scheme," or "repeals by 
implication are strongly disfavored," as starting points for infer-
ring immunity.94 These terms add little to solving the more fun-
damental problem of how regulatory policy and competition can 
be reconciled. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the statu-
tory schemes of regulation, the implementation of those schemes 
and the competitive situations have varied so greatly from in-
90. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
91. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 
92. In FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953), Justice Frankfurter 
stated that, with regard to the congressional intent of the Communications Act, restric-
tions on entries into communications existed because "Congress may have considered the 
possible inconvenience to the public of duplicate facilities-as would clearly be the case 
with telephones .... " [d. at 92-93. 
93. See notes 43 and 45, supra. 
94. See notes 32-36, supra, and cases cited therein. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6
1983] ANTITRUST LAW 63 
dustry to industry that no coherent body of antitrust implied 
immunity law really exists. Instead, the Ninth Circuit's factual 
examination of "special aspects" of an industry views a regula-
tory statute's silence concerning antitrust immunity in light of 
contemporary political policy, technology and economics. 
Despite its laissez /aire result and more rational implied 
immunity standard, Phonetele's reasoning is questionable. The 
court appears to have ignored the clear language of the Act, 
which mandates that the FCC keep itself informed "as to tech-
nical developments and improvements in wire and radio commu-
nication . . . to the end that the benefits of new inventions and 
developments may be made available to [consumers]."9IiNo 
doubt Congress gave the inquisitory incentive to the FCC, rather 
than to the courts, as the former would obviously be better able 
to conduct investigations and compile studies toward such 
ends.96 However, the Phonetele court conducted its own inquiry 
as to an aspect of the Act that clearly seems the domain of the 
FCC. 
Even if the Phonetele decision can be seen as deferential to 
the FCC's duty to keep apprised of the latest technology, the 
court ignored the extent to which the FCC has actually satisfied 
that duty. This is particularly true when considering 
interconnection. 
First, the FCC itself has expressed a preference for competi-
tion concerning interconnection. This is manifested both in its 
arguments set forth in court9'1 as well as in its consistent rejec-
tion of interconnection-restricting tariffs.9s Further, there is no 
95. 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1976). See United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. FCC, 436 
F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970) for one court's interpretation of the great deference that should 
be given the FCC to sanction new inventions in conformity with this mandate. 
96. One author suggests this as Congress' abdication of responsibilities "to whatever 
branch of government that seems willing to assume them." He suggests instead the for-
mation of some entity, similar to the Temporary National Economic Committees in the 
1930's, in order to study the basic conflicts between regulation and competition in each 
regulated industry. See Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 44 CINN. L. REV. 191, 
205-06 (1975). 
97. "The CommiBBion has never considered its authority over equipment intercon-
nection to displace the antitrust laws." Memorandum of FCC as amicus curiae in United 
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978), 62 F.C.C.2d 1102, 
1114 (1975). 
98. For a discussion of FCC involvement with interconnection tariffs and related 
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reason to assume that the FCC-proposed registration program 
for interconnection devices does any less than allow for competi-
tion simultaneous with protection of the phone network. It 
therefore appears that court intervention is not only inappropri-
ate, but unnecessary to prohibit antitrust violations, at least in 
the discreet area of telecommunications interconnection. t! 
Second, the court's ad hoc approach to implying antitrust 
immunity forced it to completely retrace the FCC's involvement 
in the area. The Commission's findings could just as well have 
been found erroneous by the court, a body that has far less expe-
rience with interconnection activities than the Commission. It 
thus remains unclear whether the FCC or any regulatory agency, 
if subject to such scrutiny, has any de facto authority.ee 
Ultimately, the decision appears to be an expression of the 
court's dissatisfaction with the Act's basic regulatory scheme. 
From the court's extensive exposition of the history of intercon-
nection tariffs, and the FCC's registration program as a solution 
to the instant problem, one can infer that the court sees a cum-
bersome, ineffective mechanism which inefficiently addresses 
contemporary economic problems. 
The court's view is undoubtably "fashionable" as the dis-
sent notes. IOO However, deregulation should not be undertaken 
by the judiciary.lol The inherent lack of consistency, a product 
of jurisdictional and factual differences in each case, provides 
little assistance toward resolving important questions of eco-
nomic policy which prompted the need for antitrust laws and 
activity, see Phonetele, 664 F.2d at 723-25. 
99. The Act gives the United States Court of Appeals the power to review the FCC's 
orders and decisions but is silent as to whether the court may review investigations of 
the FCC which have not culminated in a particular order or decision. See 47 U.S.C. § 
40I(b) (1976). Further, the appellate courts may only inquire into the FCC's reasoned 
consideration of relevant factors, and is necessarily narrow to give proper effect to the 
agency's expertise. See, e.g., Civic Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976). 
100. 664 F.2d at 753. See supra notes 43 and 45 for some of the recent cases attack-
ing the apparent telephone company monopolies. The recent Justice Department con-
sent decree reflecting the breakup of AT & T and its subsidiaries is further evidence of 
the "fashion". 
101. The inherent limitations of the court's powers of review of the FCC arise from 
47 U.S.C. § 402 (1976). 
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regulatory statutes. 102 
The Phonetele court may not have needed to address the 
more vexing policy questions. The majority of decisions involv-
ing the antitrust liability of AT & T and similar state and local 
entities have favored the entry of new products into the market-
place, particularly regarding interconnection. loa Thus, the 
court's result was not unusual and unlikely to provoke any con-
troversy. Future cases, where results are less "fashionable", will 
provide a better test of whether courts should implicitly deregu-
late or impliedly immunize. 
Mark Aveis· 
NEW PRESUMPTION OF PREDATORY PRICING UNDER 
THE SHERMAN ACT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental 
Baking Co., 1 the Ninth Circuit held that anticompetitive con-
duct under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act2 may be 
shown by proof of pricing below the average variable cost of pro-
duction (A VC). As a corollary, prices above A VC or marginal 
102. Regulatory laws are predicated on the assumption that unrestrained interaction 
of competitive forces in a particular industry will not serve the public interest. Antitrust 
laws, on the other hand, are based on the notion that such unrestrained interaction will 
yield the best allocation of economic resources. See e.g., 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 1, 4-5 (1971), cited in Phonetele v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph, 435 F. Supp. 207, 210 (C.D. Cal. 1977). 
103. See 664 F.2d 716, 719 n.l, and cases cited therein. 
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
1. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Browning, J., and Peck, J., sitting by designation, dissenting) (as amended on denial of 
rehearing and rehearing en bane, Feb. 10, 1982. Wallace, J., dissented from denial of 
rehearing en bane and filed opinion), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 57 (1982). 
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) states: 
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize. . . any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign Nations, shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony .... " Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits private plaintiffs to sue for treble 
damages for injuries suffered as a result of "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
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cost (MC) may be considered predatory. In addition, the court 
held that in the appropriate circumstances, the other elements 
of an attempted illegal monopolization may be inferred from 
proof of such conduct.s 
Plaintiff, an independent bakery, and defendant were com-
petitors in the Northern California wholesale bread market.· 
Both parties sold pound and pound and one half loaves of white 
bread; both sold their product under a "private" label and an 
"advertised" label. II Plaintiff alleged that the growth of the pri-
vate label bread market in the area during 1967 and 1968 began 
to weaken defendant's market for its advertised label, and that 
in response, defendant undertook a strategy of predatory pric-
ing6 to eliminate competition in the private label bread market.7 
At trial, plaintiff introduced evidence that defendant had 
reduced its wholesale price on one pound loaves of private label 
from nineteen cents to seventeen and two-tenths cents during 
the period from 1970 to 1973.8 Also, plaintiff introduced expert 
testimony that during 1972 and 1973, the price charged by de-
fendant to wholesalers was below its average variable cost of 
production.9 It was also shown that during the late 1960's and 
early 1970's, the wholesale bakers in the area were experiencing 
excess productive capacity,t° and that beginning in 1967, plain-
tiff suffered operating losses until going out of business in 1976, 
five years after filing its complaint.ll 
3. Inglis also presented claims under the Robinson·Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and the California Unfair Practices Act, CAL. Bus. & PROI'. 
CODE §§ 17000·17101 (West 1982). This note will focus solely on the Sherman Act claims. 
4. William Inglis & Sons v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 416 
(N.D. Cal. 1978). 
5. Id. Private label bread is sold under a brand name individual to the purchasing 
store. Advertised label is a national brand name available to all stores. Plaintiff's adver· 
tised label was "Sunbeam", and defendant's was "Wonderbread". The chief difference, 
aside from label design and packaging, is the price. This being the case, an advertised 
label is more profitable than a private label. Id. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 40·55 for a discussion of predatory pricing. 
7. By driving out competitors, defendant could raise prices of private label and reo 
duce the competitive disadvantage of its highly profitable "Wonderbread". 461 F. Supp. 
at 416. 
8. 668 F.2d 1014, 1025. 
9. 461 F. Supp. 410, 418. 
10. This was due in part to the establishment of "captive bakeries" by large chain 
stores. Id. at 416. 
11. 668 F.2d 1014, 1024. 
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On this evidence, the jury awarded over four million dollars 
in treble damages on plaintiff's claim of attempted monopoliza-
tion.12 The trial judge granted defendant's motions for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and alternatively, for 
a new trial. 13 In granting the JNOV, the trial judge concluded 
that plaintiff's showing of below average variable cost pricing 
was not competent evidence to state a prima facie case of price 
predation.14 Although the court recognized that average variable 
cost may be used as an evidentiary surrogate for marginal cost, 
the standard endorsed in the Ninth Circuit, there may be cases 
that are not amenable to this substitution.1O Even if this were a 
case where average variable cost could be used as evidence, the 
district court judge found that plaintiff's evidence of this cost 
figure was erroneous, and that in itself would warrant a JNOV.16 
The unreliability of plaintiff's cost study was cited as the reason 
for granting the new trial motion as well.17 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of JNOV, but con-
cluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in 
granting a new trial. 18 
B. BACKGROUND 
In order to state a claim for attempted monopolization 
under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, three basic ele-
ments of proof are required: (1) a specific intent to obtain or 
exercise monopoly power; (2) a dangerous probability of success 
in realizing the proscribed goal; and, (3) predatory or anticompe-
titive conduct directed toward accomplishing that goal.19 
Specific Intent 
To establish liability for attempted monopolization, plaintiff 
must prove that it was defendant's design or purpose to obtain 
power to control prices or exclude competition from the relevant 
12. 461 F. Supp. at 415. 
13. [d. at 415. 
14. [d. at 419. 
15. [d. at 418. 
16. [d. at 419. 
17. [d. 
18. 668 F.2d 1014, 1039. 
19. See California Computer Prod., Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 . 
F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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market segment.20 More specifically, what is required is an in-
tent to gain this market power through the use of unfair or pred-
atory means.21 "The mere intention of [defendant] to exclude 
competition. . . is insufficient to establish specific intent to mo-
nopolize by some illegal means . . . . To conclude otherwise 
would contravene the very essence of a competitive marketplace 
which is to prevail against all competitors. "1111 Defining specific 
intent in terms of some "bad" conduct attempts to distinguish 
between legitimate and predatory conduct,lI8 and as such, evi-
dence of that conduct is indispensable.1I4 Thus, one who specifi-
cally intends to acquire the power to control prices or exclude 
competitors, but uses a legitimate means such as efficient pro-
duction, will not be found to have the intent required to satisfy 
this element/oil! 
Direct evidence of a specific intent to unlawfully acquire 
market power is generally rare, and defendant's subjective state 
of mind is difficult to prove.28 For this reason, the specific intent 
element may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, princi-
pally of a defendant's conduct.lI7 It has been held that such an 
inference is proper when the defendant exercises a large degree 
20. See Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978) (defendant distilling company not subject to 
liability under § 2 for geographical price variations); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 
F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964) (oil company that imposed 
exclusive dealing requirements and "tying" arrangement requiring purchase of that com-
pany's accessory products upon its dealers subject to liability under §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act). 
21. 668 F.2d at 1028. -
22. Blair Foods Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (cot-
ton seed oil manufacturer/distributor not subject to liability even where there is direct 
evidence of intent, absent some unlawful conduct). Accord Buffalo Courier-Expre88, Inc. 
v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1979); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 
958, 977 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). 
23. 668 F.2d 1014, 1028. 
24.Id. 
25. California Computer, 8upra note 19, at 742; United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 
563, 571 (1966) (acquisition of monopoly power as a result of a superior product, busine88 
acumen, or historical accident, not within the scope of § 2). 
26. "[A]vailability of evidence of improper intent is often a function of luck and of 
the defendant's legal sophistication, not of the underlying reality." R. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW - AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 1.89-1.90 (1976). "Ordinarily, specific intent is 
difficult to prove." Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 
1973) (stringent credit terms demanded by defendant resulting in loss of business to 
plaintiff motivated by legitimate business concerns, not from a conspiratorial motive; 
market power not essential to attempt claim). 
27. 668 F.2d 1014, 1027. 
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of control over the market,28 or in the absence of significant 
market power, where the conduct is "of a kind clearly threaten-
ing to competition or clearly exclusionary."29 Some cases seem to 
require an actual violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust 
Act. sO The consensus in the Ninth Circuit seems to endorse the 
"clearly threatening" language as the guide to the sort of con-
duct required to support the inference of specific intent.S! 
Dangerous Probability of Success 
This element originates in the relationship between the sep-
arate offenses of monopolization and attempt to monopolize. S2 It 
has been treated as equivalent to significant market power.ss 
Some decisions have held that proof of substantial market power 
28. See Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., supra note 20, at 474. 
29. Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d at 854 n.4. Accord Hunt-Wes-
son Foods, Inc.v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1980); California Com-
puter Prod., Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737; Sherman v. 
British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979); Gough v. Rossmoor 
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979). See generally 
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 134-40 (1977). 
30. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 936 (1979) (refusal of community newspaper to print plaintiff's advertisements not 
per se unreasonable restraint of trade pursuant to Sherman Act); Sherman v. British 
Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979) (automobile manufacturers 
refusal to renew franchise contract with distributor pursuant to that contract not con-
spiracy or attempt to monopolize under the Sherman Act); California Computer Prod. v. 
International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737. 
31. See Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 
1980) (non-price related activities may support an attempt to monopolize; here, defen-
dant introduced a new product similar to defendant's new product at about the same 
time, used similar label and name as plaintiff's new product, and introduced price dis-
counts to correspond to introduction of plaintiff's new product); California Computer 
Prod. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d at 737; Sherman v. British Ley-
land Motors, Ltd., supra note 30, at 453 n.47; Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., supra note 30, 
at 390. 
32. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (per Holmes, J.). 
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result 
which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monop-
oly-but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of 
nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass 
is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that 
it will happen. But when that intent and the consequent dan-
gerous probability exist, this statute . . . directs itself against 
that dangerous probability as well as against the complete 
result. 
[d. at 396 (citations omitted). 
33. Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971) (at-
tempt to monopolize claim requires "specific intent to monopolize, and . . . sufficient 
market power to come dangerously close to success.") (emphasis added). 
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may serve as direct evidence of a dangerous probability of suc-
cess,34 and may be relevant circumstantial evidence of specific 
intent.3& However, no particular degree of control over the mar-
ket is required to prove a dangerous probability of success.38 
Absent direct evidence that defendant's intent to monopo-
lize combined with predatory conduct has a dangerous 
probability of bringing about a proscribed end, this element may 
be inferred from direct evidence of specific intent plus proof of 
conduct,37 or from evidence of conduct alone, provided that it is 
the sort of conduct from which specific intent could be in-
ferred.38 As such, a showing of "predatory" or "anticompetitive" 
conduct that is clearly threatening or clearly in restraint of trade 
will state the entire claim under section 2 of the Act.3s 
Predatory Conduct 
The element of predatory conduct is central to a section 2 
attempted monopolization claim. Even where direct evidence of 
intent to monopolize and dangerous probability of success are 
present, direct evidence of predatory conduct is indispensabIe.40 
The conduct which will support the double inference must 
amount to a substantial claim of restraint of trade or be clearly 
threatening or exclusionary,·1 and has been described as activity 
"without legitimate business purpose."42 More specifically, con-
34. See California Computer, supra note 19, at 737; Sherman, supra note 29, at 453 
n.47; Janich, supra note 20, at 853; Hallmark, supra note 26, at 12. 
35. Lessig, supra note 20, at 474. 
36. Hallmark, supra note 26, at 12 n.3. 
37. Janich, supra note 20, at 853; Hallmark, supra note 25, at 12; Moore v. Jas. H. 
Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 1977); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export 
Ass'n v. Sun kist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
959 (1976). 
38. Hunt- Wesson, supra note 31, at 926; California Computer, supra note 19, at 
737; Sherman, supra note 30, at 453 n.47; Janich, supra note 20, at 854; Hallmark, 
supra note 26, at 12-13. 
39. Direct evidence of intent may permit the court to rely upon a broader range of 
predatory conduct, since the purpose of engaging in such conduct may be more clearly 
understood as predatory, even though such conduct taken alone would not clearly indi-
cate predation or support an inference of specific intent. 668 F.2d 1014, 1030. 
40. [d. 
41. See supra note 39. 
42. Chisholm Bros. Farm Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 498 F.2d 1137, 
1145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 932 (1974) (liquidation of obsolete or used equip-
ment to free t:p capital and avoid interest costs a legitimate business tactic despite short 
term loss); Mount Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 457 (W.O. 
24
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duct is predatory if the advantage to the actor is "dependent 
upon its tendency to discipline or eliminate competition; and 
thereby enhance the firm's long term ability to reap the benefits 
of monopoly power."43 
"Pricing is predatory when a firm forgoes short term profits 
in order to develop a market position such that the firm can 
later raise prices and recoup lost profits . . . . "44 While such a 
statement captures the spirit of the distinction between valued 
competitive conduct and proscribed anticompetitive conduct, 
there are economic tests that are more specific and helpful in 
determining whether a particular pricing policy is predatory 
within the meaning of the Act. 
Professors Areeda and TurnerU suggest that a price should 
not be considered predatory if it is at, or above, the firm's margi-
nal cost of production (MC). Marginal cost is that incremental 
increase in production costs associated with producing the last 
unit of production.46 This is so because short run economic wel-
fare is increased as the price is lowered toward the marginal cost 
of production, and maximized where price exactly equals MC.4? 
Pa. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969) (Chrysler subsidized un-
profitable company stores in order to sell cars at a loss; held-not a legitimate business 
purpose). 
43. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Tur-
ner) (endorsing the use of average variable cost to determine if pricing is predatory). 
44. Janich, supra note 20, at 856; Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (Independent gasoline distributor sued 
Shell Oil Company for attempted monopolization. The court affirmed a directed verdict 
for defendant for lack of proof of below A VC or MC pricing). 
45. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 711. 
46. [d. at 700. 
47. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-19 
(1970). Janich noted: 
In economic analysis, the marginal cost of a good is construed 
as the cost to society of that good, for its production requires 
resources which could be used in the production of other 
goods. The price which people are willing to pay to obtain the 
good is construed as the social value of the good . . . . As 
prices decline more people are willing to buy. For a firm to sell 
more goods, prices must be reduced. 
As a matter of short-run economic welfare, it is beneficial 
to increase production and lower prices so long as price ex-
ceeds marginal cost: In other words, so long as there are peo-
ple who are willing to pay an amount for the good which is 
above its marginal cost, it is socially beneficial to continue to 
25
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As such, any rule of law that would penalize a firm for selling at 
MC would burden the efficient allocation of resources among al-
ternative uses, at the expense of society.48 
It is when prices are set below MC that they become suspect 
since, the seller is, by definition, incurring an out-of-pocket 
"loss" for each additional unit it sells.49 The firm can continue to 
do so as long as it has cash reserves to support such losses. Such 
conduct may have the effect of expelling or excluding competi-
tors from the market for reasons unrelated to their relative 
efficiencies. llo 
The problem with MC as the standard by which predation 
is judged is that such a cost figure is not readily calculated from 
standard business records, and is somewhat difficult to prove 
with certainty. III Areeda and Turner thus suggest the use of av-
erage variable cost (A VC) as an evidentiary surrogate for MC.1I2 
Average variable cost is the total of costs that vary with the level 
of output, divided (averaged) by the number of units produced.1I3 
Typical of such costs are material and labor. Fixed costs, on the 
other hand, are those expenditures that do not vary over the rel-
evant range of production. Capital costs, plant facilities, and ma-
chinery are examples of non-varying costs; characteristic of such 
costs is that they will be incurred even if production is ceased.1I4 
increase production. Of course this will require a continued re-
duction in prices in order to sell the full amount produced. 
Thus, social welfare is maximized in the short run . . . where 
the price of the good equals its marginal cost. 
570 F.2d 848, 857 n.9. 
48. In California Computer, the Ninth Circuit found: 
The thrust of this analysis is that price reductions up to the 
point of marginal cost are consistent with competition on the 
merits, since in this case only less efficient firms will be disad-
vantaged, while a firm pricing below marginal cost by defini-
tion incurs losses, so that competition on the basis of efficiency 
in this situation is frustrated. 
613 F.2d 727, 743. 
49.Id. 
50. Janich, supra note 20, at 858. 
51. Hanson, supra note 44, at 1358; Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 700 n.13, 
716-17 & n.42. 
52. Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 717. The authors argue that even where the 
two cost measures diverge, A VC is the proper measure of cost, since pricing below A VC 
will so rarely be loss minimizing. Id. 
53. Id. at 700. 
54. Janich, supra note 20, at 858. 
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v 
For example, a firm must continue to make payments on its ma-
chinery even if it is not using it to produce its product. 
Average total cost is the sum of all fixed and variable costs 
divided by the number of units produced.1I1I Typically, a firm will 
desire to sell its product at or above this average total cost 
(ATC), thereby recovering all costs of production, including a 
reasonable return in invested capital. 
It is against this economic and legal background that the 
Ninth Circuit panel was called upon to review the grant of 
JNOV and determine whether plaintiff had effectively demon-
strated predatory pricing. 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Court's Approach to Establishing Predation 
The Inglis court held that a showing of below A VC pricing 
could in fact support the double inference of specific intent and 
dangerous probability, and state a prima facie case of attempted 
monopolization.1I6 It reasoned that although defendant had 
priced its product below its ATC, this, taken alone, would not 
prove that the conduct was predatory.1I7 Such a finding may, 
however, lead a jury to conclude that the benefit of such conduct 
was an improved market position whereby short term losses 
could be recouped. The court found that the reason below ATC 
pricing is not presumptively predatory is that such a pricing pol-
icy may be an effective means to minimize losses when the firm 
is experiencing temporary excess capacity or a decrease in the 
demand for its product.1I8 When the firm is recovering a price 
below its ATC, but above its AVC, it is recovering all of its vari-
able costs associated with continued production, and at least a 
portion of its fixed costs that would be incurred even if produc-
tion were to cease.1I9 Therefore, it would cost the firm more to 
shut down than it would to continue production at a "loss" be-
cause it would no longer be recovering that portion of fixed costs 
55. Areeda & Turner, supra note 43, at 700 .. 
56. 668 F.2d 1014, 1041. 
57. [d. at 1035. 
58. [d. at 1035 n.32. 
59. [d. at 1035. 
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that are, by definition, incllrred even if it shuts down.60 
The court did not suggest that a showing of prices below 
ATe will conclusively determine that the conduct was preda-
tory.6t Predation will be found when "the justification of these 
prices is based, not on their effectiveness in minimizing losses, 
but on their tendency to eliminate rivals and create a market 
structure enabling the seller to recoup his 10sses."82 
However, the Inglis court found that prices below AVe do 
not warrant the benefit of the doubt extended to prices above 
A ve, because the former are less likely to be motivated by some 
legitimate business purpose.6S At this price level, not only is the 
firm not recovering a portion of its fixed costs, but it is also los-
ing a portion of the additional cost associated with continued 
production. The court reasoned that if the firm is forced by the 
market to accept this price for its product, "[t)he economic case 
for discontinuance of production is strong. "64 If the firm remains 
in production at a loss under these circumstances, it is highly 
probable that doing so is part of a scheme to eventually reap ill-
gotten gains; therefore, the benefit of the doubt will go to plain-
tiff rather than defendant. 
After Inglis, a showing of prices below AVe will establish a 
prima facie case of predatory pricing, and the burden will shift 
to defendant to prove that the prices were justified without re-
gard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have on 
competitors. ell Moreover, the court emphasized that its decision 
was aimed not merely at endorsing the below Ave standard as 
an acceptable means of proof of predation, but also at "es-
chew[ing) dogmatic adherence to a particular, rigid test and to 
fashion broad and flexible objective standards concerned with 
accurately evaluating the purposes of business behavior."" The 
ultimate standard remains the same: did the justification for the 






65. Id. at 1036. 
66. Id. at 1031 n.1S. 
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of competitors such that defendant could recoup short term 
losses from its enhanced market position.87 
Determination of Fixed and Variable Costs 
The Inglis court held that the cost categories previously 
enumerated by the Ninth Circuit88 were "illustrative . . . not 
prescriptive,"89 and that determination of which costs are fixed 
and which are variable will change from case to case.70 As such, 
the categorization of fixed and variable costs, and the determi-
nation of A VC, must be made on an individual case basis. 
The first step in such a determination is to compare the 
"cost of production before and after the price reduction. The va-
riable cost would . . . be those expenses that increased as a re-
sult of the output expansion attributable to the price reduc-
tion."7l Utilizing this approach, the court avoided the problems 
of misclassifying as fixed costs those that are in fact variable, or 
as variable costs those which are actually fixed, during the rele-
vant time period.72 
. The court then reemphasized that these cost categories are 
not an end in themselves, but rather "solely for the purpose of 
. . . answering the ultimate question: Did the justification for 
the defendant's price depend upon its anticipated destructive ef-
fect on competition or was the price justified as a reasonably cal-
culated means of. . . minimizing losses, or achieving some other 
legitimate business end?"78 The court therefore held that the 
determination of fixed and variable costs, hence, the determina-
tion of A VC, is a matter for the jury with appropriate 
instructions.74 
The Dissents 
In addition to the dissent from the majority's decision by 
Judge Peck, Judge Wallace filed a dissent from the decision to 
67. [d. at 1038. 
68. Janich, supra note 20, at 858. 
69. 668 F.2d at 1037. 
70. [d. at 1038. 
71. [d. at 1037. 
72. [d. 
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deny rehearing en banco To some extent, their contentions and 
objections overlap, and where applicable, will be discussed 
simultaneously. 
First, both dissenting judges felt that allowing the double 
inference of specific intent alid dangerous probability was a de-
parture from the rule that these inferences are proper only if the 
conduct was clearly threatening or exclusionary.71~ 
Second, both judges attacked the majority's depiction of the 
relative roles of judge and jury in attempted monopolization liti-
gation. Judge Peck stated that the concept of variable cost is 
difficult enough for experts and legal specialists to define, and 
may simply confuse a jury of lay persons.76 Leaving this determi-
nation to the jury with appropriate instructions would open the 
way for jurors to "infer pricing below average variable costs from 
the jurors' preliminary view of the predatory nature of the de-
fendant's conduct, instead of vice-versa."77 Judge Wallace ob-
jected to allowing the jury to determine A VC for this reason, but 
noted that because this is now a matter for the jury, trial judges 
will be prevented from ever taking a case from the jury and dis-
posing of unmeritorous suits in the early stages of triaP8 
Judge Wallace's dissent stated his more basic disagreement 
with the majority. His reading of recent Ninth Circuit precedent 
was that a showing of below MC or A VC pricing was a prerequi-
site to a predatory pricing claim.711 His dissent observed that the 
majority's opinion, in recognizing the broad subjective rule that 
prices will be predatory depending upon the anticipated benefit, 
abandoned the MC rule and substituted in its place "a subjec-
tive and amorphous test involving a shifting burden of proof 
which leaves to the jury . . . decisional authority on attempted 
monopolization claims. "60 This leaves open the possibility that 
plaintiffs may state a prima facie case without even alleging be-
low MC or A VC prices. Although Judge Wallace recognized the 
validity of exceptions to the requirement that prices be set be-
75. [d. at 1059 (Peck, J., di88enting); id. at 1060 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
76. [d. at 1059. 
77. [d. 
78. [d. at 1064. 
79. [d. at 1062. 
SO. [d. at 1060. 
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low MC or AVC,sl, he reasoned that the majority's decision went 
too far, and endorsing the MC rule and its exceptions would 
have provided a more consistent and workable approach. S2 
D. ANALYSIS 
Under Inglis, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant 
upon plaintiff's showing that defendant engaged in below A VC 
or MC pricing. Perhaps more significantly, plaintiffs may more 
often have their cases decided by the jury in light of the recogni-
tion that prices above A VC, but below ATC, may be predatory. 
This is an apparent expansion of the type of conduct that will 
support a claim of attempted monopolization. Notwithstanding 
the dissents' claim that the holding is a departure from prece-
dent, it may be justified as reconcilable with precedent, and a 
wise policy choice. . 
All of the cases relied upon by the dissents as requiring a 
showing of below A VC or MC contain qualifying language,S3 or 
can be distinguished on their facts. S. Moreover, it had previously 
81. [d. at 1062. 
82. [d. at 1063. Of particular concern to Judge Wallace was the recent decision in 
Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979). There, a JNOV was entered against plaintiff for failure to allege prices below 
A VC or MC. Defendant provided ship assisting services and piloting by an agreement 
with his employees; defendant provided this package of services for less than they other-
wise might have been provided. It was apparent that defendant's prices exceeded average 
variable cost, exceeded the prices charged by plaintiff, and even produced a net profit. 
467 F. Supp. at 861 n.16. 
83. See Hanson, supra note 44, at 1358-59. The court recognized below MC or A VC 
pricing as a prerequisite to a prima facie case of predation, but also recognized two ex-
ceptions to the rule: some prices below MC may have a legitimate business reason, and 
prices above A VC or MC could be predatory if they were below its short run profit maxi-
mizing price and there were significant barriers to entry of the market. See also Janich, 
supra note 20, at 857 ("an across-the-board price set at or above marginal cost should 
not ordinarily form the basis for an antitrust violation.") (emphasis added); California 
Computer, supra note 19, at 740 n.19 (plaintiff failed to prove prices below MC or AVC, 
"which ordinarily is required to show predatory pricing."). 
84. Murphy Tugboat, supra note 82. The majority read that case as alleging "noth-
ing more than the fact that the agreement between defendant and its employees left 
defendant's prices lower than they otherwise might have been. The holding that such an 
allegation cannot establish an unreasonable restraint of trade . . . certainly does not 
foreclose the inquiry which we have undertaken here." 668 F.2d at 1034 n.27. That in-
quiry, specifically, was whether a case of predatory pricing "can ever be established with-
out proof of pricing below marginal or average variable cost." [d. 
In Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morren & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980), plaintiff 
. was precluded from raising the question of above A VC or MC prices as predatory when 
they are below short term profit maximization and significant barriers to entry exist, due 
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been recognized that the original Me rule would require refine-
ment as future cases arose.811 
Even were the Inglis decision an actual departure from pre-
cedent, it may be justified from an antitrust policy perspective. 
The dissents feared that complete authority would be vested in 
the jury, and trial judges would be precluded from taking the 
decision from the jury. According to Judge Wallace, this is un-
sound policy for it will reduce the ability of trial judges to dis-
miss unmeritorious suits in times of "burgeoning anti-trust liti-
gation"88 and consequently burden the district courts. While 
more cases may get to the jury because conduct that would sup-
port a claim now includes all pricing below ATe, it may be that 
these cases will be offset by those taken from the jury as a result 
of the shifting burden of proof. 
Another policy consideration that lends support to the rule 
announced by the majority is the nature of capital intensive an-
titrust defendants such as larger steel or auto manufacturers. In 
these and other areas, variable cost may represent a relatively 
small percentage of ATe, making the possibility that any given 
manufacturer will price below its AVe very slight. Plaintiffs en-
gaged in this type of suit will be less likely to incur a directed 
verdict or JNOV, but will not be afforded the benefit of a shift 
in the burden of proof, and will be left to other means to show 
that the benefit of the conduct was dependent upon an en-
hanced market position and recoupment of short term losses. 
The majority also held that the determination of fixed and 
variable costs are a matter for the jury despite the recommenda-
tion by Areeda and Turner8" that arbitrary cost categories be 
maintained. Although this rule sacrifices to some extent the ease 
of administration'of the AVe rule, it is consistent with the ma-
jority's attempt to "eschew dogmatic adherence to a particular, 
rigid test. "88 
Some increases in production may require a commensurate 
to its failure to raise the objection to the jury instructions at trial. Id. at 1033 n.27. 
85. California Computer, supra note 19, at 743. 
86. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1063. 
87. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ~ 715c, at 173-74 (1978). 
88. 668 F.2d at 1031 n.18. 
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that a complaint alleging that the state bar committed an anti-
trust violation in its grading of a bar examination stated a cause 
of action. 
Plaintiff took the Arizona bar examination in February 
1974. Two months later he was informed that he had failed.2 
Plaintiff then filed an antitrust action against the State Bar of 
Arizona, the State Bar Committee on Examinations and Admis-
sions, and the members of the Committee, alleging that the Bar 
illegally restricted competition among attorneys practicing in 
Arizona by limiting the number of attorneys who receive a pass-
ing grade on the bar exam. 
Plaintiff's specific complaint was that the Bar did not grade 
on the indicated zero to one hundred scale, but instead used a 
"raw score" system. Plaintiff alleged that the Bar determined 
the number of attorneys to be admitted, then set the passing 
score accordingly. He contended that this method of grading re-
sulted in the arbitrary exclusion of himself and others from the 
practice of law and thus unlawfully restrained trade by reducing 
the number of competing attorneys. On appeal from a dismissal, 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the 
Bar enjoyed absolute immunity under antitrust laws3 and that 
jurisdictional requirements were unsatisfied.4 
The Ninth Circuit's decision not to immunize the state bar 
from the antitrust laws symbolizes its increasing willingness to 
apply the Sherman Antitrust Act whenever concerted conduct 
restrains trade, regardless of the identity of the defendant or the 
laudable purposes asserted. This note will explore the basis for 
the court's decision and discuss its significance in terms of what 
2. Plaintiff's petitions for review by the Arizona Supreme Court and for certiorari by 
the Supreme Court were denied. Ronwin v. Committee on Examinations & Admissions, 
419 U.S. 967 (1974). Plaintiff' was denied permission to retake the bar examination be-
cause the Arizona State Bar found that he was "mentally and physically unable to en-
gage in active and continuous practice of law." The finding was affirmed by the Arizona 
Supreme Court in Application of Ronwin, 113 Ariz. 357, 555 P.2d 315 (1976), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977). 
3. The amended opinion reversed the decision to dismiss as to the individual com-
mittee members. Because no specific allegations of wrongdoing were made against the 
Bar, the dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper as to the Bar. 686 F.2d at 694 
n.l. 
4. Plaintiff' also moved for recusal of the judge. Denial of that motion was affirmed 
on appeal. 686 F.2d at 700-01. 
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can be justified as a necessary regulation of the legal profession. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The State Action Exemption 
The advent of industrialization, and the vast accumulation 
of wealth that accompanied it, necessitated statutory law to both 
preserve the tradition of free economic competition and ensure 
equality of opportunity to actual and potential competitors. II 
The Sherman Antitrust ActS was intended to stimulate competi-
tion by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and monop-
olization.7 One of the few judicially created exemptions to the 
Sherman Act is the "state action" exemption, which absolves the 
sovereign actions of a state or its agencies from antitrust liabil-
ity. Although the principle underlying this exemption emerged 
shortly after passage of the Act,S the state action immunity doc-
trine was not enunciated until 1943 in Parker v. Brown.9 In 
Parker, the Supreme Court held that a state statute authorizing 
a marketing program which allegedly restrained competition was 
not within the intended scope of the Sherman Act. 10 Examining 
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Court concluded 
that the Act prohibited "business combinations" but not official 
acts of government undertaken by a state in its sovereign 
capacity. 11 
5. The monopolistic tendencies of "trusts" and "combinations" of business and of 
capital organized and directed "to control the market by supression of competition in the 
marketing of goods and services became a matter of public concern." Apex Hosiery v. 
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940). 
6. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides in part: "Every con-
tract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise; or conspiracy in the restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared 
to be illegal . . . ." 
7. The end sought by the Act was the prevention of restraints on free competition in 
business and commercial transactions which tend to restrict production, raise prices or 
otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and 
services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury. 310 U.S. 
at 493. 
8. The principle was suggested but not fully explored in Lowenstein v. Evan, 69 F. 
908 (4th Cir. 1885). 
9. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
10. In Parker, a raisin producer-packer challenged a state program designed to re-
strict competition among growers and thereby stabilize prices in the raisin market. The 
Court held that the state "as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government 
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." [d. at 352. 
11. [d. at 350-5l. 
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Thirty two years following Parker, the potential reach of 
the state action doctrine was narrowed in Goldfarb v. Virginia 
State Bar. III The Court held that action merely authorized by 
the state was outside the state action exemption. IS The state, 
acting in its sovereign capacity, must compel the engaging in an-
ticompetitive activities to warrant application of the Parker 
exemption. U 
The Goldfarb compulsion requirement was affirmed in 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. III The Court deemed it significant 
to consider whether the particular state policy was clearly and 
affirmatively expressed and whether the state was active in su-
pervising the policy's implementation.I8 
The Court in City of Lafayette u. Louisiana Power & Light 
Co.n and California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal AluminumI8 an-
nounced a definitive two step test to establish Parker state ac-
tion immunity. First, anticompetitive activities are exempt from 
antitrust laws when they are "clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed as state policy." Second, the functioning of the 
policy must be actively supervised by the state itself. IS Midcal 
12. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, plaintiffs contracting to buy a home were re-
quired to obtain title insurance, which necessitated a title examination that could be 
legally performed only by a member of the Virginia State Bar. Plaintiffs could not find a 
lawyer willing to charge a fee lower than the schedule dictated. Id. at 776. In a suit 
alleging price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, the Court held that the Bar was not 
immune from antitrust laws and that the minimum fee schedule illegally restrained com-
petition among attorneys practicing in the state. Id. at 791-93. 
13. The defendant State Bar maintained that its actions were "prompted" by a 
state agency. The Court found no state law requiring defendant's activities and ruled 
that a mere "prompting" was insufficient to satisfy exemption under the Parker doc-
trine. 421 U.S. at 790-91. 
14. Id. at 791. 
15. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
16. Id. at 362. The Bate8 Court held that a state supreme court disciplinary rule 
prohibiting advertisements by attorneys reflected a clear articulation of the state's policy 
with regard to profeBSionai behavior sufficient to compel compliance. Moreover, the state 
supervision was active as the rule was subject to pointed reexamination by the policy 
maker, the Arizona Supreme Court. Id. at 359-63. 
17. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). 
18. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
19. Midcal, 435 U.S. at 410; Lafayette, 445 U.S. at 105. The Midcal Court held that 
California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine 
trade were not shielded by the state action exemption. As there existed no special anti-
trust immunity, the wine pricing system, "designed to maintain prices ... and to pre-
vent competition among those who traded in [competing goods]" violated the Sherman 
Act. 445 U.S. at 102-03, quoting Doctor Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 
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emphasized that the national policy in favor of competition 
mandates that both requirements of the test be met.20 
Both Midcal and Lafayette noted that "antitrust laws in 
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta 
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of 
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal free-
doms."n Midcal urged recognition of the importance of the 
Sherman Act's pro-competition policy22 as representing the fun-
damental principle governing commerce in the country.23 
The Learned Profession Exemption 
Another exemption emerged from a judicial recognition of a 
limited exclusion of "learned professions" from the scope of an-
titrust laws.24 The legislative history of the Sherman Act211 con-
tains no reference to the Act's applicability to those areas likely 
to be incompatible with the "trade or commerce" limitation, 
such as law, medicine or other learned professions.28 
In Goldfarb the Supreme Court denied that the learned 
professions are entitled to an absolute exemption from antitrust 
laws but indicated the possibility that they might receive some 
220 U.S. 373, 407 (1911). 
20. In Midcal, the state policy was clear in its purpose to maintain prices. But the 
state did not establish or regulate the price schedules, nor did it review their reasonable-
ness. The Court stated that the "national policy in favor of competition cannot be 
thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a 
private price-fixing arrangement." 445 U.S. at 106. 
21. 445 U.S. at 110; 435 U.S. at 398 n.16, quoting United States v. Topco Ass'n, Inc. 
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
22. 445 U.S. at 111. 
23. 435 U.S. at 398. 
24. This exclusion is based upon the special form of regulation imposed upon the 
professions by the states and the incompatibility of certain competitive practices with 
such professional regulation. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 779-80. 
25. See Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 31C U.S. 469, 489 (1940); Standard Oil v. United 
States, 221 U.S. I, 50 (1911). 
26. However, it is generally agreed that CongreBB used the language "trade or com-
merce" for a specific reason unrelated to intending an autonomous restriction on the 
Act's purview. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 490. The Supreme Court has stated that 
" 'trade or commerce' covers any occupation, employment or busineBB ... carried on for 
the purpose of profit or gain." United States v. National ABB'n of Real Estate Boards, 
339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950). 
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special treatment.27 The Court did not articulate the nature of 
this special treatment but did emphasize the interests of the 
states in regulating such professions.28 Consequently, lower 
courts faced with formulating a more precise definition of the 
learned professions exemption have often relied on the related 
state action exemption.29 
Jurisdictional Requirement 
The Sherman Act deals in terms of restraints of trade or 
commerce "among the several states."so If there is no restraint of 
interstate commerce, there is no violation of the Sherman Act. 
The jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act may be satis-
fied by proving that (1) the activities in question are actually "in 
interstate commerce" or (2) if the activities are local in nature, 
they substantially "affect" interstate commerce.S } 
The leading Supreme Court decision applying the "in com-
merce" test is Goldfarb. S2 There, the Court approached the ju-
risdictional issue in a practical sense, stressing that legal services 
were coincidental with commercial intercourse and in terms of 
27. In an oft quoted footnote, the Court stated that: 
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distin-
guished from a business is, of course, relevant in determining 
whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It 
would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as in-
terchangeable with other business activities, and automatically 
to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated 
in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of 
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which 
could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view 
on any other situation than the one with which we are con-
fronted today. 
421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17. 
28. 421 U.S. at 792-93. 
29. See State of Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 643 F.2d 553, 556 
(9th Cir. 1980); Feminist Woman's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). See generally Bauer, Professional Activities 
and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1975). 
30. See supra note 6. 
31. McLain v. Real Estate Board Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980). 
32. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the Court found jurisdiction, noting that in 
terms of restraining competition and harming consumers, the price fixing of title exami-
nation searches was unusually damaging. A title examination was indispensable in the 
process of financing a realty purchase, and because only a licensed attorney could legally 
examine title, consumers could not turn to alternative sources. 1d. at 782. 
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commercial continuity, they were essential.88 The Court there-
fore concluded that because lawyers play an integral role in com-
mercial intercourse, anticompetitive activities by lawyers may 
exert a restraint on commerce. M 
In McLain v. Real Estate Board Inc.,81'> the Court addressed 
the alternative "effect on commerce" test. To invoke jurisdiction 
under this test the existence of a demonstrable nexus between 
the defendant's activity and the restraint of interstate commerce 
must be established.8s It is the unreasonableness of the restraint 
and its effect on interstate commerce and not the amount of 
commerce which establishes the causal connection necessary to 
assert an antitrust violation.87 McLain also adopted a pragmatic 
approach in holding that "as a matter of practical economics" 
the challenged activity had a substantial effect on the interstate 
commerce involved.88 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
1. The Majority 
Antitrust Immunity 
The Ninth Circuit in Ronwin relied on the two step test 
enunciated in Midcal to conclude that the challenged grading 
procedure failed to warrant antitrust immunity. First, like the 
bar association in Goldfarb, the Arizona Bar had no statute or 
Supreme Court rule that required the grading procedure. Sec-
ond, the general delegation of duty by the Arizona Supreme 
Court to the Bar for examining applicants to determine whether 
they had the "necessary qualifications" did not compel the Bar 
to implement its grading procedure.89 
As the Court stated in Goldfarb, the threshold inquiry in 
determining if an anticompetitive activity is immune from anti-
trust laws is whether the activity is required by the state acting 
33. [d. at 783·84. 
34. [d. at 785. 
35. 444 U.S. 232 (1980). 
36. [d. at 246. 
37. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947). 
38. 444 U.S. at 246. In McLain, a price fixing conspiracy between real estate brokers 
was found to affect both the frequency and terms of residential sales transactions be-
cause of an inextricable dependancy on interstate financing. [d. 
39. 686 F.2d 692, 696. 
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as a sovereign.40 Thus, the Ronwin court focused on whether the 
state, acting through the Arizona Supreme Court, had an active 
hand in formulating and regulating the grading procedure. Find-
ing Bates distinguishable on its facts from those in Ronwin, the 
court found that the state bar acted independently and without 
any active supervision by the state policy maker, the Arizona 
Supreme Court. There was no state policy, clearly articulated or 
otherwise, stipulating how bar exams were to be graded.41 
The court further found that its conclusion was not incon-
sistent with the prior Ninth Circuit decisions in Hackin v. Lock-
wood,42 Chaney v. State Bar of California,43 and Brown v. Board 
of Bar Examiners. 44 While all three cases involved challenges to 
bar grading procedures, such claims were based on constitu-
tional, not antitrust principles. Hackin held that the Arizona 
state bar was an improper defendant because it was not respon-
sible for promulgating or changing the rules governing admission 
to practice law.411 In Ronwin however, there existed no rule gov-
erning bar grading procedure. 
In Brown, a challenge to a requirement that bar applicants 
graduate from accredited law schools, the court held that no 
subject matter jurisdiction existed.46 But the jurisdictionallimi-
tation stemmed from the express language of the constitutional 
provision relied upon, not because plaintiff was challenging a bar 
admission policy. The majority in Ronwin relied on the Goldfarb 
decision, that a minimum fee schedule enforced by the state bar 
violates section one of the Sherman Act, to conclude that plain-
40. 421 U.S. at 790. 
41. Id. at 696. 
42. 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966). 
43. 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967). 
44. 623 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980). 
45. 361 F.2d at 500-01. Plaintiff, a graduate of an unaccredited law school could not 
take the bar because a state rule allowed only graduates of accredited law schools to take 
the exam. Id. at 500. Plaintiff's suit against the State Bar of Arizona was held improper 
because the accreditation rule was directly promulgated and enforced by the state su-
preme court. Id. at 500-01. 
46. In Brown, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering defen-
dants to allow plaintiff, a graduate of an unaccredited law school, to take the bar exam 
despite a Nevada Supreme Court rule requiring applicants to be graduates of accredited 
law schools. The court of appeals held that plaintiff failed to meet jurisdictional require-
ments as she presented a complaint of individual constitutional deprivation and sought 
only individual redress. An attack on the overall administration of the accreditation rule 
would have been cognizable in district court. 623 F.2d at 610. 
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tiff's complaint established jurisdiction under federal antitrust 
laws.47 
In Chaney, the Ninth Circuit stated that the requirement 
that bar applicants pass an examination in essay form did not 
involve any issue of constitutional substance"s The Ronwin ma-
jority found no inconsistency between its holding and that in 
Chaney because Chaney clearly concerned the finality and na-
ture of the plaintiffs's claim and bore no relevance to the issues 
of state action or proper parties.49 
The majority then found that assuming the Bar was actively 
supervised by the Arizona Supreme Court, that factor alone 
would be insufficient to justify applying the state action exemp-
tion. lIo The national policy in favor of competition should not be 
thwarted absent a clear articulation by the Arizona Supreme 
Court that it had adopted a policy of limiting the number of 
attorneys admitted each year to the Arizona Bar.lIl Without such 
a declaration of regulatory purpose, the court held that plaintiff 
must be given an opportunity to prove that the Bar policy was 
designed to limit the number of attorneys as opposed to insuring 
that attorneys have the "necessary qualifications" to practice 
law.1I2 
Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act 
Having concluded that the Bar was not immune from anti-
trust action, the majority reasoned that on remand, plaintiff 
might meet the jurisdictional requirements by establishing that 
the grading procedure evidenced a demonstrable nexus with re-
straint of interstate commerce.1I8 Plaintiff argued that because 
47. 686 F.2d at 698 n.6. 
48. In Chaney, plaintiff, a law school graduate, twice failed the California bar exam. 
Although he was eligible to take the exam a third time, he chose to sue the state bar 
alleging that its use of hypothetical fact problems requiring essay answers deprived him 
of his constitutional rights. 386 F.2d at 963. In affirming dismiBSal of the complaint, the 
court stated that the existence of the admi88ion qualification had a rational connection 
with the capacity to practice law, for it inherently involved a primary basis of general 
legal service. [d. at 964. 
49. 686 F.2d at 698 n.6. 
50. Ct. California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105. 
51. 686 F.2d at 698. 
52. [d. at 698. 
53. [d. at 699. 
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the services of Arizona lawyers were required by people living 
outside Arizona, denial of admission to the bar was not a matter 
confined to state lines. Because the Bar's grading procedure arti-
ficially limited the number of lawyers admitted to practice in 
Arizona, the price paid by out-of-state clients for legal services 
performed by Arizona lawyers was higher than if the number of 
lawyers was not restricted.1i4 
The majority concluded that plaintiff could establish juris-
diction under either the "in commerce" or the "effect on com-
merce" test. Although plaintiff did not specifically state which 
interstate transactions require legal services nor indicate how 
substantial an effect on interstate commerce results from limit-
ing the number of lawyers, the majority predicted that if he 
could conceivably establish that legal services constitute an in-
dispensable and inseparable component of certain interstate 
transactions, the "in commerce" test could be met.1i1i Similarly, 
plaintiff did not allege that there were an appreciable number of 
interstate transactions taking place in Arizona or that limiting 
the number of lawyers had a substantial effect on the number 
and size of the transactions. However, the majority stated that if 
he could substantiate the impact of the grading procedure, juris-
diction could be established under the "effect on commerce" 
test.1i6 
2. The Dissent 
The dissent contended that the precedents established in 
Hackin, Brown and Chaney mandated that the proper defen-
dant in an action challenging a state bar's grading procedures is 
the state supreme court. Because plaintiff complained of the 
failure of the supreme court to admit him, and admission to the 
bar is within the province of the supreme court, not the state 
bar, the dissent concluded that the supreme court was the 
proper defendant.1i7 
Furthermore, the dissent accused the majority of creating 




57. Id. at 702. 
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lenge was a constitutional one. The dissent interpreted Brown as 
holding that because bar admission procedures are purely a mat-
ter of local concern, the only constraints on the state's exclusive 
jurisdiction are constitutional in nature. &8 
The dissent also charged that the majority disregarded the 
tradition of deference to state discretion in admission proce-
dures. Because such deference never existed toward the state's 
ability to regulate fees, the majority's reliance on Goldfarb was 
misplaced. The majority applied erroneous standards to deter-
mine whether a state agency was exempt from antitrust laws. 
The dissent regarded the regulation of bar admissions as an in-
tegral governmental function. &9 For that reason, the Arizona Su-
preme Court oversees bar admissions and delegates authority to 
examine the fitness and competence of bar applicants.8o There-
fore, the dissent concluded that the state supreme court had 
merely entrusted the grading of examinations to the bar. The 
dissent found that the court incorrectly distinguished Bates by 
concluding that the state bar, as opposed to the supreme court, 
was committing the alleged anticompetitive act, and that there 
was no clearly articulated policy regarding grading procedures. 
The dissent attacked the first characterization by asserting 
that the Ninth Circuit had thrice reiterated81 that the state su-
preme court is the proper party when grading procedures are 
challenged.82 The second characterization was unfounded as the 
two step Midcal test was met. The Arizona Supreme Court au-
thorized the Bar to grade examinations, but the Bar acted as a 
mere instrumentality of the court. The state supreme court itself 
ultimately approved every bar application. By approving the 
challenged procedures of accepting recommendations for admis-
sions based on those procedures, the state impliedly validated 
the Bar's grading system.83 This implied validation rendered 
Bates rather than Goldfarb more directly analogous to Ronwin.84 
58. [d. at 703. 
59. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 424. 
60. The dissent maintained that if the state's agents abuse their authority, the 
proper remedy is not an antitrust but a constitutional attack. 686 F.2d at 703-04. 
61. See Hackin, supra note 42; Chaney, supra note 43; Brown, supra note 44. 
62. 686 F.2d at 703. 
63. [d. at 707. 
64. In Goldfarb, the alleged anticompetitive activity was the promulgation of a fee 
schedule by the state bar. The Court found the state bar was not immune because this 
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In Ronwin, the challenged activity was the grading of examina-
tions on a curve. The alleged anticompetitive result of artificially 
limiting the number of attorneys was to monopolize. The dissent 
concluded that the majority erroneously subjected the state bar 
to antitrust laws by focusing on the alleged result and ignoring 
the immunity issue decided in Bates.611 
The dissent contended that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Community Communications Co., Inc. u. City of Boulder,66 al-
though involving an action by a city, supported conferring anti-
trust immunity to the Arizona State Bar. In City of Boulder, the 
Court held that the state's "mere neutrality" toward municipal 
actions was not a clear articulation of state policy. The actions 
of the municipalities were not "comprehended within the powers 
granted," since the term "granted" necessarily implies an affirm-
ative addressing of the subject by the state.67 In no way had the 
Arizona Supreme Court taken a position of "neutrality" allowing 
the Bar to do as it pleased. To the contrary, it had affirmatively 
addressed the grading of exams by granting to the Bar the power 
to examine applicants and recommend admission of those 
qualified.88 
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the dissent attacked the fact 
that plaintiff's complaint neither identified a relevant market 
nor alleged a substantial impact on such a market.69 The dissent 
contended that as there was no possibility that he might prove 
substantial impact, plaintiff did not warrant an opportunity to 
demonstrate the elements of his case.70 
illegal price fixing waa expressly disclaimed by the state supreme court. 421 U.S. at 781. 
Bates, on the other hand, concerned a prohibition against advertising. The alleged result 
waa to monopolize. The defendant bar association waa held to be immune because the 
state supreme court itself promulgated the rule. 433 U.S. at 362. 
65. 686 F.2d at 707. 
66. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982). 
67. ld. at 843 (emphaais in original). 
68. Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 707. 
69. ld. at 708. 
70. The dissent concluded that on the facts of the caae, plaintiff could not establish 
that the curved grading system had more than a trivial impact on interstate commerce. 
The ability of applicants to reapply permits them to remain within the potential stream 
of commerce. ld. 
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D. SIGNIFICANCE 
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated that the threshold 
inquiry in determining if anticompetitive activity is state action, 
outside the purview of the Sherman Act, is whether that activity 
is required by the state acting as sovereign. But this is only the 
first, not the final step of inquiry.71 The very word "threshold" 
suggests that something more than a sovereign command may be 
necessary to invoke state action immunity. 
Goldfarb acknowledged that the interest of the state in reg-
ulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to 
the primary governmental function of administering justice and 
have historically been "officers of the Courts."7! Restricting the 
practice of law to persons licensed by the state is both a legiti-
mate and necessary exercise of the state's inherent regulatory 
power.7S The regulatory purpose is to further the primary duty 
for which the profession exists: to serve the public.74 By both 
insuring that persons rendering legal services are qualified to do 
so' and imposing upon lawyers a degree of accountability to the 
state, the regulatory purpose is served.76 
But in order for a particular regulation to survive a Sher-
man Act challenge, it must contribute directly to improving ser-
vice to the public. That which only suppresses competition be-
tween practioners will fail the challenge. This interpretation 
permits a harmonization of the ends that both the profession 
and the Sherman Act serve. 
The dissent correctly reiterated this principle but failed to 
recognize that the issue in Ronwin was how the state action ex-
emption should be applied to the regulation of admission into 
the legal profession. The significance of the Ronwin decision is 
71. See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. at 425. 
72. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 792. The Goldfarb Court found that 
states have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, 
and as part of their power to protect public health, safety and other valid interests, they 
have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the 
practice of professions. [d. 
73. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc., v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. 
Virgo 1977), vacated, 571 F.2d 205 (1978). 
74. Boddicker V. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626, 632 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied., 434 U.S. 825 (1977). 
75. 549 F.2d at 632. 
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the court's focus on the relationship between the anticompeti-
tive activity and the regulatory purpose to be met. This focus 
may well be used to confront the "special treatment" dilemma 
left by Goldfarb78 and to implement a more realistic approach to 
the legality of professional regulation. 
The Supreme Court has stated that a state may not immu- . 
nize anti competitive activity from antitrust laws merely by au-
thorizing it.77 The Ronwin majority accordingly questioned 
whether a subsequent Arizona Supreme Court rule requiring a 
"proposed formula" for grading bar examinations would necessa-
rily afford state action immunity.78 
Under Goldfarb, the relevant inquiry would be whether 
there is any "public service aspect" or any "other feature" of the 
legal profession which justifies anticompetitive activity.79 The 
Ronwin court however, by emphasizing the national policy in 
favor of competition, subjected professional regulation to the 
same legal analysis as similar conduct by those engaged in 
purely commercial enterprises.80 The court focused on the nexus 
between the grading procedure and the professional duty of 
public service. Recognizing that this link was tenuous, the ma-
jority concluded that the state action exemption did not apply. 
The dissent manifested the tenuousness of this relationship 
by asserting that the state "impliedly validated" the Bar's grad-
ing procedure. An implied validation does not constitute a 
clearly articulated policy compelled by the state.81 The dissent 
76. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17. 
77. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
78. Defendants contended for the first time on rehearing that effective January 5, 
1974, the Arizona Court adopted Rule 28(c)(VII)(B) to include a requirement that the 
Bar file with the Court thirty days before each examination the proposed formula for 
grading the entire examination. The analysis might have been different had this provi-
sion been brought to the attention of the district court. Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 697. 
79. See Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1975, 76 COL. L. REV. 191, 200 
(1976). 
80. The Supreme Court in Goldfarb stated: "It is no disparagement of the practice 
of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has a business aspect, .... " 421 U.S. at 
788. 
81. Ostensibly, the dissent was seeking the protection of the learned professions ex-
emption which emphasizes a relative weighing of the harms and benefits of a challenged 
activity, absent the compulsion requirement. Even under this alternate theory, an "im-
plied validation" does not justify the Bar's grading procedure as there was no direct 
contribution to the regulatory purpose of serving the public. 
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ignored the heavy presumption against implicit exemptions.82 
Countervailing policies must be demonstrated to sufficiently 
overcome the presumption.83 
Under Ronwin, the jU!:'!tification for such policies would be 
evaluated with respect to their dependence on the challenged ac-
tivities. The majority applied this relational test to determine 
whether the Bar truly acted with dedication to their assigned 
task of determining the "necessary qualifications" of applicants 
by separating the competent from the incompetent applicants. 
By setting the passing score according to the number of appli-
cants to be admitted, the Bar arbitrarily eliminated otherwise 
competent applicants. Because all competent applicants were 
not admitted, the regulatory purpose was not served. Restricting 
the practice of law by limiting the number of those licensed 
served only to unreasonably suppress competition among law-
yers. The result was an illegal restraint of trade.84 
The majority further upheld the national policy favoring 
competition by predicting that plaintiff could establish that this 
restraint had a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to in-
voke the Sherman Act. Recognizing that interstate commerce is 
an intensely practical concept drawn from the normal and ac-
cepted course of business811 and that legal services play an inte-
gral role in that stream of commerce, the court rejected the posi-
tion that history has accorded the legal profession "a role all its 
own."88 Instead of retreating to the "learned professions" doc-
trine, Ronwin offers a foundation for the development of a more 
realistic approach to the issue of professional regulation. Ronwin 
does not, as the dissent maintained, disregard the traditional 
deference to state discretion in admission procedures. Rather, by 
demanding that regulatory policies be legitimately met, the 
court has supported the premise that the legal profession exists 
82. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 399; Goldfarb, 435 U.S. at 787. 
83. 435 U.S. at 400. 
84. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500 (when purchasers or con-
sumers are deprived of the advantages which they derive from free competition, there is 
an antitrust violation). 
85. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 231 (1947). 
86. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957). 
46
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6
94 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:79 
to serve the public. 
Katherine Morrow Ha/ferkamp* 
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 
A. REFINING THE BOUNDS OF THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION 
In several recent cases, the Ninth Circuit examined the 
Parker state action exemption,l expanding the scope of the ex-
emption to parties who promote a clearly articulated state 
policy. 
In Miller v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n,2 plaintiffs, 
owners of a cafe and tavern, sued the Oregon State Liquor Com-
mission and liquor wholesalers, alleging that the pricing prac-
tices promulgated and enforced by the Commission violated the 
Sherman Act.8 Without expressing any opinion as to whether 
the practices in fact constituted antitrust violations, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that Oregon's in-
volvement in regulation and control of the liquor industry" was 
sufficient to establish immunity from federal antitrust law under 
the state action exemption. 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Oregon law did not 
meet the state supervision requirement of the exemption. As in 
California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum/' 
the state neither established prices, monitored, nor reviewed the 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. The leading case establishing the state action exemption from antitrust liability is 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker doctrine provides that parties who act 
under the direction of a state government should not incur federal antitrust liability. 
The Supreme Court, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 
U.S. 97 (1980), held that immunity under Parker requires that (1) the challenged re-
straint must be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy; and, 
(2) the policy must be actively supervised by the state itself. [d. at 105. 
2. 688 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Browning and Boochever, JJ.) (as amended on denial of rehearing, Sept. 27, 1982). 
3. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
4. See OR. ADMIN. R. 845-10-210 (1980), OR. ADMIN. R. 845-6-090 (1981). 
5. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
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reasonableness of the price schedules. Because there was no 
"pointed reexamination" of the pricing program, the Oregon law 
was distinguishable from other states' laws completely control-
ling the distribution of liquor, which had been granted antitrust 
immunity.s Such comprehensive regulation is immune under 
Parker because "the state' has substituted its own supervision 
for the economic constraints of the competitive market."7 In 
Miller, however, regardless of whether the law was one clearly 
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, Oregon's 
mere authorization and enforcement of the pricing program was 
insufficient to establish antitrust immunity. 
In Benson u. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners,8 
plaintiffs challenged Arizona's regulation of the practice of den-
tistry. Arizona's regulatory scheme distinguishes between "li-
censes" to practice dentistry, which are granted only to those 
who pass the state's dentistry examination, and "restricted per-
mits", for which that examination is not a prerequiste. Holders 
of restricted permits are allowed to practice dentistry, but only 
as unsalaried employees of charitable dental clinics. Plaintiffs, 
all of whom held licenses to practice dentistry in other states, 
contended that the scheme violated federal and state antitrust 
laws.9 Plaintiffs alleged that the Board had combined with Ari-
zona dentists and dentists' organizations to restrain and monop-
olize the practice of dentistry in the state by restricting entry 
into the profession, limiting the number of dentists and fixing 
prices. The Ninth Circuit held that the Board was immune from 
antitrust liability under the state action exemption. 10 
Because the system was clearly articulated in state stat-
utesll and was actively supervised by a state agency, the Ninth 
Circuit found both of the Midcal criteria12 satisfied. The court 
6. 688 F.2d at 1226. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 4-15 (1979). 
7. 688 F.2d at 1225, quoting P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALY-
SIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION 73 (1978). 
8. 673 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Pregerson, J.; the other panel members were 
Ferguson, J. and Orrick, D.J., sitting by designation) (as amended, May 17, 1982). 
9. Plaintiffs also alleged violations of their constitutional rights of due process, equal 
protection and interstate travel. The court found those allegations to be without merit. 
[d. at 276-78. 
10. [d. at 276. 
n. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1201-32-1290 (1976). 
12. See supra note 1. 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/6
96 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:94 
emphasized that the detailed nature of the statutory scheme il-
lustrated the Arizona legislature's intent to affirmatively man-
date a state policy for the regulation of dentistry.I3 Supervision 
by the Board of Dental Examiners for licensing was found to be 
the equivalent of supervision by the Arizona Supreme Court of 
the state's ban on attorney advertising in Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizona.14 The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's assertions that 
the Board acted outside the scope of the legislature's directives 
and therefore state action immunity was inapplicable. The 
Board needed only to show that the authority it was given im-
plied that the legislature contemplated the kind of action 
taken. Iii 
The Ninth Circuit further found that the Arizona dental 
regulations satisfied a second criterion mandated by Bates for 
applying the state action exemption: existence of a strong state 
interest in the challenged restraint. Bates emphasized that 
states have a vital interest in protecting the public by regulating 
the legal profession, and that such regulation had been a tradi-
tional state function. 18 The Benson court found the regulation of 
dentistry, as a healing profession, equally a traditional state 
function to protect the public.l"l 
In Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs,18 the issue was 
whether an agreement between competitors at the same level of 
the market structure to share the use of a racetrack facility es-
sential to their horseracing business constituted a "horizontal re-
straint",.' and was therefore a per se violation of the antitrust 
13. 673 F.2d at 275 n.4. Arizona statutes, supra note 11, established the Board, con-
ferred upon it the power to regulate the practice of dentistry and control admission 
thereto, and commanded it to administer examinations "on both theory and clinical pro-
ficiency" as a prerequiste for dental licenses and establish the system of restricted per-
mits. [d. at 275. 
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
15. 673 F.2d 272, 276 n.8 (emphasis in Benson). 
16. 433 U.S. at 361-62. 
17. 673 F.2d at 275 n.6. The court·distinguished Benson from Community Commu-
nications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982), in that Arizona's legislature af-
firmatively mandated the challenged policies, rather than adopting a neutral stance to-
ward regulation of dentists. 673 F.2d at 275 n.4. 
18. 670 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were 
Wright, J. and Poole, J., concurring specially) (as amerided, Feb. 26, 1982), cert. denied, 
102 S. Ct. 2308 (1982). 
19. 670 F.2d at 820. 
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laws. The Ninth Circuit held that it was not. Although the 
Ninth Circuit expressed its interest in promoting competition, 
the court reasoned that finding a violation in this case would 
effectively reduce competition.20 The court recognized that the 
plaintiff's real objective was to increase its own control. over the 
facility, not to increase the extent to which all competitors share 
in the use of the facility. Alternatively, the court held that the 
allocation provisions of the agreement were immune from anti-
trust law under Parker.21 
Citing the Midcal criteria and its recent application by the 
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit found that application of the 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar22 "compulsion" test was not re-
quired.23 Rather, the relevant inquiry when regulated industries 
"involve a blend of public and private decisionmaking"24 is the 
degree to which the state or its agency has put "its own weight 
on the side of [the challenged regulation]."211 Arizona statutes 
limit the number of days allowed for horseracing and allocated 
those days to the most qualified applicants through issuance of 
permits.26 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the underlying 
public policy evidenced by the state's regulation was a strong 
interest in controlling horseracing because it is incident to gam-
bling.27 The Ninth Circuit found allocation by private agreement 
integrated within this statutory scheme. Therefore, such alloca-
tion was included in the state's clearly articulated policy to re-
place unfettered competition in application for racing dates with 
regulation.28 
The Ninth Circuit further held that the state's obligation to 
"thoroughly investigate" permit applications constituted active 
state supervision. Because an applicant must meet all the rele-
vant criteria, the state in effect did review the "reasonableness" 
20. [d. 
21. [d. at 822. 
22. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
23. 670 F.2d 813, 823 n.8. 
24. [d., quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976). 
25. 670 F.2d at 823 n.8. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 
(1974). 
26. [d. at 824. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-108-01 (1974 & Supp. 1980-81). 
27. 670 F.2d at 825. 
28. [d. 
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of the private date allocation.29 
The Miller court confined its analysis to the state supervi-
sion requirement of the state action exemption. The view that 
immunity should be granted only when the state has substituted 
its own supervision for the constraints of the competitive market 
also guided the Ninth Circuit in Benson and Turf Paradise. But 
the Benson and Turf Paradise opinions emphasized that when a 
strong state interest underlies the policy articulated, the vitality 
of that interest may reduce the need to meet the second Midcal 
criterion, i.e., active supervision by the state of the challenged 
activity. 
In Benson, although the statute did not itself enumerate all 
the requirements that the Board imposed, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to conclude that the Board exceeded its authority. so As 
long as the Board took the kind of action which furthered the 
state interest in regulating the medical professions, its ability to 
refer to specific detailed legislative authorization was 
unnecessary. 
Similarly, in Turf Paradise, the Ninth Circuit stressed the 
strong state interest involved. The private parties were not com-
pelled to impose the challenged regulation. The state only "in 
effect" supervised the private regulation. But because the state 
clearly intended to avoid the consequences of unrestricted com-
petition in what was essentially a gambling operation, private 
regulation in furtherance of such an interest received state ac-
tion immunity. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Miller was con-
tent to require strict adherence to the state supervision require-
ment because there was no strong public sentiment surrounding 
the regulation of the liquor industry. The situation in Miller was 
purely economic and the court was not moved to consider public 
policy. 
The pattern to be derived from these three cases is that the 
Ninth Circuit will impose an objective standard unless the issue 
at bar concerns an area in which the state has a vital interest. 
Deference may then be given to that interest regardless of 
29. [d. 
30. 673 F.2d at 275·76. 
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whether there is active supervision by the state. 
B. THE SEPARATE NATURE OF Two PRODUCTS IN AN ALLEGED 
TYING ARRANGEMENT 
An illegal tying arrangement involves a seller who refuses to 
sell one product (the tying product) unless the buyer also 
purchases a second product (the tied product) from the seller. 
Such arrangements are proscribed by the Sherman Antitrust 
Act31 and the Clayton Act3S since this type of aggregation im-
pedes market competition on the merits of the tied product. To 
establish the existence of a tying arrangement, there must be 
two separate products involved, with the sale of one conditioned 
upon the purchase of the other; the seller must engage in a mod-
icum of coercive conduct toward the buyer; the seller must pos-
sess economic power in the market for the tying product; and a 
not insubstantial amount of commerce must be affected by the 
arrangement.33 In three recent decisions, the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the first of these elements, the separate nature of the 
two products in an alleged tying arrangement. 
In Krehl u. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,u a class action 
antitrust suit was brought by franchised store owners who were 
bound by an agreement with Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co. 
(BRICO) and area franchisors. The agreement permitted 
franchised store owners to sell only Baskin-Robbins ice cream 
products purchased from the area franchisor in whose territory 
the store is located. BRICO licensed the area franchisors to use 
Baskins-Robbins trademarks and formulae to manufacture Bas-
kin-Robbins ice cream and establish franchised stores. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the sale of the franchised store was ille-
gally tied to the purchase of the seller's ice cream.311 
31. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). 
32. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1975). 
33. See Hirsch v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1982), 
and cases cited therein. 
34. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Rein-
hardt, J., and Cordova, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing and rehearing en banc 
denied, Feb. 24, 1982). . 
35. Plaintiff also alleged that BRICO's "dual distribution" system operated as an 
unlawful horizontal market allocation and that BRICO and its area franchisors conspired 
to fix prices. The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish either of these claims. 
[d. at 1354-58. 
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The court first looked to the nature of the products involved 
in the alleged aggregation. The franchised stores were character-
ized by the license to use BRICO's trademark, so the trademark 
allegedly operated as the tying product and the ice cream as the 
tied product. In an earlier case, Siegal v. Chicken Delight,36 the 
Ninth Circuit had found that, under certain circumstances, a 
trademark may be sufficiently unrelated to the alleged tied 
product to warrant treatment as a separate item.37 However, the 
court found the facts of Siegal to be inapposite and held that 
the Baskin-Robbins trademark was not distinguishable as a sep-
arate product from Baskin-Robbins ice cream. 
The difference between Siegal and the instant case lay in 
the franchising structure. In Siegal, the franchisor had a busi-
ness format franchise system created merely to conduct business 
under a common tradename. In such a system there is a remote 
connection between the trademark and the products the 
franchisors are compelled to purchase. The trademark, the tying 
product, was used to compel the purchase of items such as paper 
cups which were commonly available elsewhere at lower prices. 
Consumers had no reason to associate the trademark with the 
tied goods. Because a trademark represents goodwill and stan-
dards of quality, the source of component products does not 
matter so long as the standards of quality are met.38 
On the other hand, BRICO operated on a distribution 
franchise system. The franchised stores served as "conduits 
through which the trademarked goods of the franchisor flow to 
the ultimate consumer."39 The product was prepared by the 
franchisor or licensees·o according to detailed specifications. 
Thus the treatment served not only to identify the business for-
mat, but it also represented the quality of the product. The 
trademark and the product were inextricably linked in the mind 
of the consumer. The court noted that it would be consumer 
36. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971). 
37. [d. at 48-49. 
38. 664 F.2d at 1353. 
39. [d. 
40. The court rejected the contention that even though Baskin-Robbins ice cream is 
manufactured by licensees instead of BRICO, the trademark must be a separate product 
because "the trademark still serves only to identity that distinctive ice cream is made in 
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fraud to sell a less expensive brand of ice cream under the 
BRICO trademark.41 
Since the BRICO trademark identifies the ice cream sold in 
the franchised stores, the ice cream and the trademark do not 
exist independent of one another. An illegal tying agreement 
under the antitrust laws requires as its first element the exis-
tence of two distinct products,4lI therefore the BRICO trademark 
could not be illegally tied to the ice cream sold in its franchised 
stores.43 
Hamro u. Shell Oil CO.44 presented the Ninth Circuit with a 
similar fact situation. Plaintiff, a service station operator, 
brought suit under the Cartwright Act, the California antitrust 
statute.411 The plaintiff operated his service station under lease 
and dealer agreements with Shell. The complaint alleged that 
the lease was conditioned upon the purchase of gasoline from 
the oil company. However, the court found that the lease was 
not based on any purchasing condition nor did the lease require 
the lessee to enter a dealer agreement with Shell.46 
The dealer agreement signed by the plaintiff did not require 
that he purchase Shell gasoline, and it further stipulated that 
the plaintiff could not use the Shell trademark unless he pur-
chased gasoline from Shell. Citing Baskin-Robbins, the Ninth 
Circuit found that the Shell trademark is not a product separate 
from Shell gasoline.47 Therefore, an illegal tying arrangement 
could not exist using a "source trademark" and the product it 
represents.48 
41. [d. at 1354 n.15. 
42. [d. at 1352. 
43. [d. at 1354. 
44. 674 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Canby, J.; the other panel members were 
Fletcher, J. and Copple, D.J., sitting by designation) (as amended on denial of rehearing, 
Aug. 25, 1982). 
45. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600 et seq., 16720, 16726, 16727 (West 1964). The 
court found that these codes were modeled after the Sherman Antitrust Act so that fed· 
eral case law could be used to interpret the California statute. See 674 F.2d at 786·87. 
Plaintiff also presented claims for intentional interference with business advantage and 
unlawful price discrimination. The court held for the defendant on all the claims 
presented. [d. at 786. 
46. [d. at 787. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. at 788. 
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Although no trademark was involved, the separate products 
issue was also decisive in a third case, Hirsh v. Martindale-Hub-
bell, Inc. 49 Plaintiff, an attorney, brought suit under the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts alleging two illegal tying arrangements in 
connection with the defendant's directory of attorneys. The di-
rectory offers two types of advertisements to attorneys, apart 
from the regular listings: informative cards and professional 
cards. Attorneys wishing to purchase informative or professional 
cards must also subscribe to the directory. In order to buy a pro-
fessional card, one must also purchase an informative card. The 
defendant allowed narrow exceptions to these requirements for 
foreign attorneys and those sharing office space with a subscrib-
ing attorney.IIO The plaintiff alleged that the sale of informative 
cards was illegally tied to the sale of the directory and that the 
sale of professional cards was illegally tied to the sale of inform-
ative cards. The lower court had granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant. III 
The Ninth Circuit first analyzed the relationship between 
the informative cards and the directory to determine whether 
the separate products element of a tying arrangement had been 
satisfied. Since the purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent 
efforts to impede competition without regard to the merits of 
the product, the court looked at the effect of the relationship. 
The court found that because effective advertising requires both 
listings and circulation, the requirement that attorneys advertis-
ing in the directory also subscribe to it results in a wider dissem-
ination of the listings.1I2 The quality of the advertising within the 
directory is thus improved, which is the opposite of an effort to 
impede competiton on the merits of the product. This "synergis-
tic relationship" between the informative cards and the direc-
tory itself precludes a finding that they are separate products. 
Such an arrangement promotes consumer welfare by contribut-
ing to the quality of the product. liS 
The informative cards were also found to be inseparable 
49. 674 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1982) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Hug 
and Alarcon, JJ.) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, June 15, 1982). 
50. 674 F.2d at 1345·46. 
51. [d. at 1346. 
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from the professional cards for the purposes of the tying ar-
rangement analysis. In order to be separate products, there must 
be separate markets for each. The court found that since both 
cards constituted legal advertising, they had identical audiences 
and the same competitors. Thus there was no danger to free 
competition to allow the sale of one to be conditioned upon the 
purchase of the other.IH 
54. [d. at 1350. 
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